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When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: 
Public Health and Safety Should 
Trump Corporate Profits  
Julie E. Zink* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses the historical and ongoing use of trade 
secrets to withhold critical information from the public.  Through its 
text and footnotes, the Article discusses the positives and negatives of 
trade secret protection; addresses historical and current examples of 
trade secret abuse; analyzes the inadequate solutions that have been 
tried and proposed; and, ultimately, recommends changing trade secret 
law by incorporating the precautionary principle into the definition of 
a trade secret to ensure that protection will no longer be available for 
information that endangers public health. 
This Article is both timely and necessary, as the public is 
continually bombarded with new products about which critical 
information is withheld.  In fact, an average of twenty new chemicals 
enter the marketplace each week.  As a result, unknowing humans are 
acting as test subjects while companies, secreting away important 
information about the products’ impact on public health, rake in record 
profits.  Drawing lessons from decades of past injuries, it is past time 
for the United States to borrow from our European neighbors and 
incorporate the precautionary principle into US trade secret law.  
Doing so will allow for protection of trade secrets while also 
maintaining public health.  This Article provides a useful proposal for 
academics, legislators, courts, and practitioners to consider as they 
contend with the increased use of trade secrets and the numerous 
health hazards caused by trade secret products and processes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While there are positives to trade secret protection, such 
protection should not be available when a trade secret causes harm to 
public health and safety.  Given the historical abuses committed by 
corporations in the name of trade secrecy and the lack of measures to 
effectively curtail such abuses, it is time to revise trade secret law to 
ensure history does not continue to repeat itself.  Companies should no 
longer be permitted to hide behind the shield of trade secrets and 
withhold information that negatively impacts public health and 
safety.  To accomplish this goal, US trade secret law should 
incorporate the European precautionary principle; doing so will shift 
the burden to the trade secret owner to prove that its asserted trade 
secret does not endanger public health.  Once that burden is met, 
trade secret protection will be available.  If, however, the burden 
cannot be met, then the asserted secret should be revealed as a matter 
of public health and safety.   
Part II of this Article discusses the positive societal effects 
associated with the protection of trade secrets.  Conversely, Part III 
points out that secrecy also has some innate dangers.  Next, Part IV 
addresses historical examples of such abuses, while Part V discusses 
some current examples.  Part VI then explains that, unfortunately, 
neither the legislative nor the judicial branches have been able to 
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solve this dilemma of trade secret abuses.  Several possible solutions 
or partial solutions have been offered, and those suggestions are 
covered in Part VII.  However, none of the solutions adequately 
balance the interests of the trade secret owners with those of the 
public.  Therefore, Part VIII lays out a proposal to revise the law by 
incorporating the precautionary principle into the definition of a trade 
secret.   
II. THE BENEFITS OF PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 
In Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, US 
philosopher and ethicist Sissela Bok acknowledges that not all secrecy 
is intended to deceive or cause harm.1  Rather, some “secrecy is 
invoked to protect what one owns.”2  For instance, protecting the 
knowledge one has gathered or developed is often essential to 
launching or maintaining a successful business.3  This is true whether 
the information is technical in nature or business related.4  If the 
process for creating a particular product is unknown by all but one 
company, then having such information gives that company an 
advantage over competitors.5  Likewise, if a company devotes its time, 
energy, and money to collecting information on its customers (e.g., 
preferred product specifications, pricing data, or points of contact), 
that company would not want to make such information available to 
its competitors.6  In this regard, “American businesses own an 
estimated $5 trillion dollars of trade secrets.”7   
 
 1. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 7 
(Vintage Books 1989) (1983). Sissela Bok, the daughter of two Nobel Prize winners, received her 
Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard in 1970. See id. at 334; see also Judy Klemesrud, Sissela Bok: 
A View of Life and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1983, at 66, www.nytimes.com/1983/03/06/style/ 
style-sissela-bok-a-view-of-life-and-ethics.html [https://perma.cc/5DKJ-74N7]. Formerly a 
Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University, she is currently a Senior Visiting Fellow at the 
Harvard School of Public Health. Faculty Members, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population-development/about-us/people/faculty/#B 
[https://perma.cc/4UV8-YD8S] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
 2. BOK, supra note 1, at 24. 
 3. See id. at 139 (“Incentives are strong to be the sole beneficiary of a process unknown 
to competitors . . . .”). 
 4. See id.; see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2017) (“The 
definition of trade secret is thus unlimited as to any particular class or kind of matter . . . .”). 
 5. See MILGRIM, supra note 4. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Hakeem Jeffries et al., Why Protecting Our Trade Secrets Is Essential to Saving the 
Economy, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/protecting-
our-trade-secrets-is-essential-for-the-economy-2014-8?pt=385758&ct=Sailthru_BI_Newsletters& 
mt=8&utm_source=Triggermail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=email_article 
[https://perma.cc/L6ZZ-CZEQ]. 
1138 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 20:4:1135 
While some companies protect their technical information by 
obtaining patent protection on their inventions, others choose not to 
do so.8  First, many inventions may not be patentable, and if success is 
not likely, then companies make the decision to not disclose the 
information or spend the hefty fees associated with drafting and filing 
a patent application.9  Second, it is much cheaper to maintain a trade 
secret than to file for a patent, and patent infringement suits are less 
likely for plaintiffs to win.10 
Trade secrecy provides a measure of security to the owners of 
such information, and compared to many other types of legal 
protection, it is generally not difficult or expensive to meet the 
required elements under the law.11  Information will be protected as a 
trade secret if a person or entity (1) has specific information that (2) 
has independent economic value (actual or potential), (3) which is not 
generally known or readily ascertainable, and (4) has been protected 
by reasonable secrecy measures.12  All of these elements must be 
proven in order to obtain trade secret protection.13   
 
 8. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1974). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 487; BOK, supra note 1, at 140. 
 10. BOK, supra note 1, at 140 (“About half of all lawsuits brought to defend trade secrets 
are decided in favor of the plaintiffs, but less than 30 percent of patent-infringement suits are 
decided in favor of the patent owners. As a result, companies are resorting more often to trade 
secrecy, even when patenting is a possibility.”); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482–83. 
 11. See R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets v. Patents: The New Calculus, LANDSLIDE, 
July–Aug. 2010, at 1, 1–2 (“[P]atents are harder to get and harder to defend.”); Derek Handova, 
The Business of IP: Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets, IPWATCHDOG (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/25/choosing-patents-and-trade-secrets/id=69368/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y4RJ-TDQM] (“Patents cost tens of thousands of dollars while trade secret 
protection is essentially free . . . . [W]ith trade secrets there is no need to comply with formalities 
or any formal process. And as a result, they can take immediate effect, with no significant 
procedures or costs associated with their creation . . . .”). 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 defines the 
term “trade secret” as encompassing  
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, 
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or 
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing 
if—(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the 
disclosure or use of the information. 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.); see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). A similar definition is found in the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, which has been adopted by forty-seven states. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); Acts: Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMMISSION, 
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In terms of the “information” component, all forms and types of 
information are potentially protectable, whether tangible or 
intangible.14  The only limitation is that the claimed information must 
not be a vague or abstract concept.15  The owner must be able to 
articulate with specificity what it is claiming to be a trade secret.16   
As to the “independent value” component, the trade secret 
owner must show that the information has “actual or potential” 
value.17  While use of the trade secret was originally required in order 
to obtain protection, that ceased with the adoption of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA’s) definition of a trade secret, which 
discarded the Restatement of Torts’ use requirement.18  Thus, 
information has “potential” value even if there is no product or process 
utilizing the information.19  Courts determine whether value is 
present by examining the competitive advantage the information 
provides to the owner or the advantage it would provide to the owner’s 
competitors, as well as the amount of effort or money expended by the 
owner in developing the information.20   
The “not generally known or readily ascertainable” component 
essentially requires that the information be secret.21  To determine 
whether this element is met, courts consider the extent to which the 
information is known outside of the owner’s business and the ease or 
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.22    
Finally, the “reasonable secrecy measures” component requires 
that the owner take affirmative steps to protect the information.23  
 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/MPD5-
THPY] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
 13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
 15. See SL Montevideo Tech., Inc. v. Eaton Aero, LLC, 491 F.3d 350, 351–52 (8th Cir. 
2007); Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 264 (5th Cir. 2007); Big Vision Private 
Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 224, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a 
vague and indefinite piece of information cannot be protected). 
 16. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).  
 18. See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01 (“The UTSA substantive aspect closely parallels 
the 1939 Restatement definition except that the UTSA has no requirement that, to be protected, 
information must be used in one’s trade or business.”). 
 19. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). 
 20. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722,  
726–28 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i); see MILGRIM, supra note 
4, § 1.03. 
 22. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722. 
 23. See Incase Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Learning 
Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722. 
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While the measures need not be perfect or even ultimately successful, 
the owner cannot merely sit back and do nothing.24  Thus, courts 
consider the extent to which the information is known by employees 
and others involved in the owner’s business, as well as the measures 
taken by the owner to guard the secrecy of the information from 
outside parties.25   
According to Sissela Bok, “[t]rade secrets are [c]ompany assets.  
They were developed at great expense and only after long periods of 
experimentation.”26  Under John Locke’s labor theory of property, 
people have a right to what they have made.27  Protecting trade 
secrets encourages continued investment and innovation,28 helps to 
maintain commercial ethics,29 and allows for protected disclosure of 
the information to partners and employees.30   
However, trade secret protection can be lost in the blink of an 
eye.31  It takes little time to copy large amounts of information,32 
 
 24. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80 (7th Cir. 
1991); see also E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(“[A]n impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement . . . .”); Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 
1279, 1284 (Vt. 2001). 
 25. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722. 
 26. BOK, supra note 1, at 146. 
 27. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1689) (“Whatsoever, 
then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”); see 
BOK, supra note 1, at 143 (“[A] view of property expressed most forcefully by Locke [is] that 
individuals have a right to what they have made, joined their labor to, or worked to wrest from 
nature.”); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,  
28–33 (2007) (discussing the influence of Lockean theory on trade secret protection). 
 28. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also BOK, supra 
note 1, at 147–48. 
 29. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481–82; MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01. 
 30. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485–86 (stating that if trade secret protection were 
unavailable, “[s]ecurity precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and fringe 
benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret invention 
would be fixed in an amount thought sufficient to assure their loyalty. Smaller companies would 
be placed at a distinct economic disadvantage . . . .” (footnote omitted)); MILGRIM, supra note 4,  
§ 1.01 (“[R]easonable use of a trade secret including controlled disclosure to employees and 
licensees is consistent with the requirement of relative secrecy.”); ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON 
K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW 1 (2012) (“If the requirements of 
trade secret law are met, the holder of an idea or other bit of information can share it with others 
without losing legal protection. In this way, trade secret law is believed to encourage innovation, 
invention, and creativity and to facilitate the sharing of information.”). 
 31. See BOK, supra note 1, at 144–45 (“Unlike most forms of property, trade secrets are 
of an ephemeral nature. They may be lost merely from being photographed or even seen; they 
may evaporate as a result of someone’s facial expression at the moment one guesses at a formula. 
Controls over exclusivity, permanence, and transmissibility are more fragile for trade secrets 
than for other property; unusual secrecy is therefore needed to guard them.”). 
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especially in the digital age.33  Previously, trade secret information 
could be protected by locking it in a safe or filing cabinet behind a 
locked office door inside a secure building.34  Now a trade secret can be 
lost within seconds.35  Nearly everyone is carrying a cell phone that 
allows them to record sounds, snap pictures, and take videos; 
employees can email files to themselves (or others), download files to a 
removable drive that can be easily carried off-site, or upload files to 
the cloud;36 angry ex-employees can anonymously publish company 
trade secrets online; operators can maneuver drones to peer inside 
property;37 and hackers can gain access to a company’s computer 
system from down the street or from the other side of the globe.38  
Each year, roughly $300 billion of trade secrets are stolen from US 
businesses.39  As a result, the need for new technologically evolving 
and tighter secrecy measures has grown.40   
 
 32. See id. at 148 (“To develop new processes and achieve new knowledge in industry 
takes time and often great resources; to copy them, very little.”). 
 33. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,  
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2009). 
 34. See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.04 (citing State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay 
Mkt. of Cincinnati, 988 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Ohio 2013); McClain v. State, 269 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2008)). 
 35. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through 
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting the Internet “facilitates 
complete destruction of a trade secret in an instant”); Michael H. Bunis & Anna Dray-Siegel, You 
Need to Work Harder to Fight Trade Secret Theft, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:38 PM), 
https://www.choate.com/uploads/1178/doc/Bunis,_Dray-Siegel_-_Law360_-_You_Need_To_Work_ 
Harder_To_Fight_Trade_Secret_Theft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C4S-HC3R] (“[A]n electronically 
stored trade secret can be stolen with little more than the click of mouse [sic], particularly if an 
employee already has access to trade secret information. An employee intent on stealing trade 
secret information may send it using a Web-based personal email account, download it to a 
personal USB drive, or upload it to a community or public cloud, all without alerting his or her 
employer.”). 
 36. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484, 2489 (2014); Jenna M. Andrews, Note, 
An Inside Job: The Intersection of Federal Computer Law and Trade Secret Law in Cases of 
Insider Misappropriation, 18 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 176 (2017); see also Bunis & Dray-Siegel, 
supra note 35 (“Use of . . . cloud computing infrastructures such as Dropbox[] creates additional 
opportunities for determined employees to disclose or send trade secret information outside of 
the organization.”). 
 37. See Declan McCullagh, Technology as Security, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129,  
138–39 (2001); Wayne Bond, Drones & Trade Secrets—How Low Can They Go?, SEYFARTH SHAW: 
TRADING SECRETS (May 9, 2016), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2016/05/articles/trade-
secrets/drones-trade-secrets-how-low-can-they-go/ [https://perma.cc/85RC-ZVNP]. 
 38. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rats, Traps, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 381–82 
(2016) (“Technology has facilitated both the amount of trade secrets that are now stored 
electronically, and the rise of cyber intrusions.”). 
 39. Jeffries et al., supra note 7. 
 40. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING 
THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
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III. THE NEGATIVES OF SECRECY  
Not surprisingly, there are also negatives involved in 
protecting trade secrets—namely, providing a legal shield that 
corporations can use to conceal nefarious activities.  According to Bok, 
“[t]rade secrecy is the most frequent claim made by those who want to 
protect secrets in business”; corporations may assert such claims to 
protect legitimate secrets and, in some cases, to abuse or exploit their 
trade secret protections.41  
Trade secrecy can cause harm.  First, trade secrecy does not 
always promote one of its stated policy goals—innovation.42  Rather, it 
encourages companies to engage in duplicative investment in research 
and development.43  It also frustrates the disclosure goals of the 
patent system when companies opt for trade secrecy rather than 
patent protection.44   
 
ccips/file/938321/download [https://perma.cc/7Z6M-RKL5] (“Emerging trends indicate that the 
pace of economic espionage and trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating . . . . 
Trade secret theft threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and places the 
security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.”). 
 41. BOK, supra note 1, at 136. 
 42. See CLAIRE HOPE CUMMINGS, UNCERTAIN PERIL: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE 
FUTURE OF SEEDS 81–82 (2008) (“Private property rights are fundamental to our economic 
system, and they have extended their reach into every aspect of our lives. . . . It has gone too far, 
however, and the overuse of intellectual property rights is stifling innovation. . . . When research 
was being conducted openly and in the public interest, it was shared by publication. But now 
intellectual property rights and patents constrict this activity and limit what is studied.”). 
 43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012). Trade secrets are not “generally known” or 
“readily ascertainable” by others. See id. If kept secret, then the trade secret can last forever. See 
id. Unlike patents, which require dissemination of information in exchange for a limited 
monopoly, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 
U.S. 124, 142 (2001), trade secret owners are required to prevent disclosure of the claimed 
information, see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85 
(1974); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). Given that 
independent creation and reverse engineering of trade secret information are permitted, 
companies in the same discipline often spend valuable resources trying to create the same 
information, which results in duplication of investment. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 
In fact, it is possible for two companies to independently develop the same trade secret 
information. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 
1961); Fishkin v. Susquehanna Partners, G.P., 563 F. Supp. 2d 547, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Doing 
so does not destroy the trade secret, as long as disclosure does not occur. See Fishkin, 563 F. 
Supp. 2d at 582. Rather, those companies are independent owners of the same trade secret. See 
du Pont, 288 F.2d at 911. 
 44. See BOK, supra note 1, at 140 (“[C]ompanies are resorting more often to trade 
secrecy, even when patenting is a possibility.”); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 486–87, 489 
(“The interest of the public is that the bargain of 17 years of exclusive use in return for disclosure 
be accepted. If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that 
holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state 
protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue 
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Second, secrecy debilitates judgment.45  If only a select few 
know the trade secret, then they are the only ones who can make 
decisions regarding the information at issue.  This postpones discovery 
of errors and effectively shuts out criticism from others who may be 
able to provide valuable feedback.46  As a result, faulty assumptions 
about risk may mean that little to no deliberation takes place 
regarding whether to continue, modify, or cease use of the trade 
secret.47   
Third, secrecy has the capacity to corrupt and to invite abuse.48  
Due to others’ lack of knowledge regarding the trade secret, those with 
knowledge operate in a system free from oversight.49  This lack of 
accountability coupled with the desire for higher profits (for which 
they are held accountable) results in a loosening of moral 
constraints.50  When no one is present to hold a mirror up to their 
faces, they can downplay the consequences of their actions and 
disregard any negative impacts the trade secret may have on their 
employees, their consumers, the general public, or the environment.   
 
to exist.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 
624 (2013). 
 45. BOK, supra note 1, at 25 (“Secrecy can harm those who make use of it in several 
ways. It can debilitate judgment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, 
leading people to become mired down in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and 
ways of thinking. Neither their perception of a problem nor their reasoning about it then receives 
the benefit of challenge and exposure. Scientists working under conditions of intense secrecy 
have testified to its stifling effect on their judgment and creativity.”). 
 46. See id. at 26 (“[S]ecrecy can hamper the exercise of rational choice at every step: by 
preventing people from adequately understanding a threatening situation, from seeing the 
relevant alternatives clearly, from assessing the consequences of each, and from arriving at 
preferences with respect to them.”). 
 47. See id. at 196 (“[Secrecy] thwarts reasoning: it limits the perception of problems and 
of alternative ways to approach them, prevents adequate deliberation, and deflects critical 
feedback, thus restricting choice and decision.”). 
 48. See id. at 123 (“Confidentiality, like all secrecy, can then cover up for and in turn 
lead to a great deal of error, injury, pathology, and abuse.”); id. at 166 (“[M]ilitary secrecy . . . 
insulates from criticism and feedback, and thus opens the door to abuse . . . .”); Wendy E. 
Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law To Produce Needed 
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1645, 1701 (2004) (“Using broad 
trade secret protections, manufacturers impede public access to a large body of information 
regarding their manufacturing processes, testing data, and the contents of their toxic products 
and waste streams. . . . Firms that are unenthusiastic about granting public access to 
information on the harms created by their products and activities face few restraints in abusing 
these generous trade secret protections.”). 
 49. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 189 (2007) (“[T]rade secrecy by its very definition abhors 
both transparency and public accountability.”). 
 50. See BOK, supra note 1, at 173 (“To the extent that rulers become convinced of their 
rightful freedom from oversight and from ordinary moral constraints, they grow predictably more 
corrupt and exploitative.”). 
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IV. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE 
Corporations assert trade secrecy for a number of reasons,51 
some of which are improper.  For decades, companies have been 
introducing new products, such as cigarettes,52 asbestos fibers,53 
pesticides (namely, DBCP),54 and lead paint55 into the market.  The 
 
 51. See id. at 147 (“[C]orporations conceal their activities and especially their plans from 
many others: from shareholders who might question investments and links to other companies; 
from the government, in order to avoid interference and the publicity that may surround 
information once it is given over into the government’s hands; from consumers, in order not to 
lose business; and from employees about such matters as hidden dangers at the workplace, 
imminent relocation plans, and risks of bankruptcy.”). 
 52. See CLIVE BATES & ANDY ROWELL, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO EXPLAINED: THE 
TRUTH ABOUT THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY . . . IN ITS OWN WORDS 1, http://www.who.int/tobacco/ 
media/en/TobaccoExplained.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBL3-4RN2] (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); 
NORBERT HIRSCHHORN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS: WHAT THEY 
ARE, WHAT THEY TELL US, AND HOW TO SEARCH THEM 5, http://www.who.int/tobacco/ 
communications/TI_manual_content.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ22-ASQK] (last visited Mar. 14, 
2018) (“In 1998, six million once secret documents from seven cigarette manufacturers doing 
business in the US became available to the public as a result of legal action.”); Ryan Jaslow, Big 
Tobacco Kept Cancer Risk in Cigarettes Secret: Study, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-tobacco-kept-cancer-risk-in-cigarettes-secret-study/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ANM-X888] (“New research suggests that tobacco companies have known for 
40 years that cigarette smoke contains cancer-causing particles, but deliberately hid the 
information from the public.”). 
 53. See DANIEL STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: SCIENCE, 
EVIDENCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 71 (2014) (“Reports of harmful effects of asbestos on 
lungs date to 1898.”); Lorraine Mallinder, Deadly Secret: A 1940s Whistle-Blower Uncovers 
Hidden Evidence Linking Asbestos to Cancer, CAN.’S HIST., Apr.–May 2011, at 33, 33–38, 
https://mallinder.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/asbestos.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRU4-CS3G] 
(regarding similar secrecy tactics in Canada); Jim Morris, Facing Lawsuits Over Deadly 
Asbestos, Paper Giant Launched Secretive Research Program, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 
2014, 12:19 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/21/13559/facing-lawsuits-over-deadly-
asbestos-paper-giant-launched-secretive-research [https://perma.cc/CR32-CK9M]; Bill Richards, 
New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-Up of Effects on Workers, WASH. POST  
(Nov. 12, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/12/new-data-on-
asbestos-indicate-cover-up-of-effects-on-workers/028209a4-fac9-4e8b-a24c-50a93985a35d/ 
?utm_term=.30acab7443fc [https://perma.cc/P3NS-NDHU] (“Documents uncovered in a series of 
recent lawsuits indicate that for more than three decades the nation’s largest asbestos companies 
hid evidence about potentially fatal effects of asbestos exposure on millions of U.S. workers.”). 
 54. See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report 56:50–57:29 (PBS television broadcast, Moyers & 
Co. 2001), http://billmoyers.com/content/trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/2G4E-76XK]. For access 
to the transcript, see Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report Program Transcript, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/transcript.html [https://perma.cc/K27A-9VR9] (last visited Apr. 
1, 2018). Around 1977, the public learned that 1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP), which Dow, 
Occidental, and Shell all produced, is “a reproductive toxicant, a very powerful carcinogen.” See 
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra, at 54:02–58:21; see also EPA, 1, 2-DIBROMO-3-
CHLOROPROPANE (DBCP) (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/ 
1-2-dibromo-3-chloropropane.pdf [https://perma.cc/72RU-Y5QV] (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR EVNTL. 
ASSESSMENT, EPA, INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM (IRIS): 1, 2-DIBROMO-3-
CHLOROPROPANE (DBCP) (1991), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/ 
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public later discovered that these products were dangerous.  For 
decades, however, companies used trade secrecy to conceal the 
dangerous aspects of their products.56  The following  
examples—perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), vinyl chloride, and 
benzene—merely scratch the surface of companies’ use of trade secrets 
to hide known health dangers from the public.57   
A. Perfluorooctanoic Acid  
In 1951, the chemical company DuPont began purchasing 
PFOA, a man-made biopersistent and bioaccumulative chemical, from 
the 3M Company to aid in its manufacture of Teflon, a nonstick 
 
subst/0414_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRX4-5Y7W]); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra, 
at 56:24–56:49 (narrating a Dow Chemical Research Laboratory memorandum from July 23, 
1958: “Testicular atrophy may result from prolonged repeated exposure. A tentative hygiene 
standard of 1 part per million is suggested.”); id. at 57:56–58:16 (narrating an Occidental 
interoffice memorandum from April 29, 1975: “We are slowly contaminating all wells in our area 
and two of our own wells are contaminated to the point of being toxic to animals or humans. 
THIS IS A TIME BOMB THAT WE MUST DE-FUSE.”). 
 55. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY 
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 88–91 (2013) (discussing secret internal documents which 
reveal that the lead paint industry knew the dangers that lead caused decades before the public’s 
discovery); Luke Broadwater, Advocates Say Lead Paint Industry Should Be Held Liable in 
Poisoning of Baltimore Children, BALT. SUN (Feb. 27, 2016, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-ci-lead-poisoning-
20160227-story.html [https://perma.cc/DDH9-MNE5] (“The paint industry knew about the 
dangers of lead, and they still sold lead-based paint to the public.”). 
 56. See BOK, supra note 1, at 146; see also Jaslow, supra note 52; Kristen Lombardi, 
Benzene and Worker Cancers: ‘An American Tragedy’, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 7, 2014, 
3:37 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/12/04/16320/benzene-and-worker-cancers-
american-tragedy [https://perma.cc/9FBU-X2Z2]; Morris, supra note 53; Nathaniel Rich, The 
Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-
nightmare.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KUT8-9G4H]; Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 
54, at 10:57–11:36. 
 57. See STEEL, supra note 53, at 71 (“There are numerous examples of environmental 
problems in which effective action was preceded by extended delays, during which time harms 
accumulated that ultimately resulted in a much greater mess to clean up than if prompt action 
had been taken. . . . [T]he history of environmental policy is replete with many additional cases: 
asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), and 
leaded gasoline to name just a few. In most cases, the time lapse between the initial evidence of 
harm and effective regulatory action was a decade or more, and in some instances, as in the case 
of asbestos, it was over a century.”); see also Susan Scutti, Study: Public Water Supply Is Unsafe 
for Millions of Americans, CNN (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/health/ 
contaminated-water/index.html [https://perma.cc/RLR8-UPYS] (“Millions of Americans may be 
drinking water with unsafe levels of industrial chemicals . . . . These chemicals, known as 
polyfluoroalkyl and perfluoroalkyl substances or PFASs, have been linked to high cholesterol, 
obesity, hormone suppression—and even cancer. Introduced more than 60 years ago, PFASs are 
a category of man-made chemicals that degrade very slowly, if at all, in the environment.”). 
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coating applied to skillets and pans.58  In addition to cookware, PFOA 
was ultimately used in hundreds of other products, including food 
containers, clothing, and carpet.59   
By 1961, through self-funded, secret medical studies, DuPont 
became aware that PFOA was dangerous,60 yet the company remained 
silent.61  Meanwhile, employees regularly contracted  
“Teflon flu”—exemplified by “fever, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting—after 
working in one of the PFOA storage tanks.”62  Employees were 
instructed not to bring their work clothes home anymore.63   
3M also reported several concerns to DuPont.  In 1978, 3M told 
DuPont that PFOA had been detected in the blood of workers at a 
plant that manufactured the chemical.64  In 1981, 3M reported that 
PFOA caused birth defects in rats.65  Thereafter, DuPont learned that 
two of its seven pregnant female employees gave birth to children with 
facial deformities.66 
Despite these health concerns and 3M’s recommendations for 
how to properly dispose of PFOA—through incineration or disposal at 
 
 58. Rich, supra note 56; see Michael Hawthorn, INTERNAL WARNINGS: Industry 
Memos Show DuPont Knew for Decades That a Chemical Used to Make Teflon Is Polluting 
Workers and Neighbors, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2003); see also Opening Brief of 
Appellants at 6, Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1166) (stating that PFOA “persists in the environment and accumulates in living organisms over 
time”); Editorial, Despite Clear Dangers, DuPont Kept Using a Toxic Chemical, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/opinion/despite-clear-dangers-dupont-kept-using-
a-toxic-chemical.html [https://perma.cc/J4YR-7DM8]. 
 59. See Sharon Kelly, DuPont’s Deadly Deceit: The Decades-Long Cover-Up Behind the 
“World’s Most Slippery Material”, SALON (Jan. 4, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2016/01/ 
04/teflons_toxic_legacy_partner/ [https://perma.cc/22AE-GS9U]; Dennis Thompson, Are There 
Toxins in Your Fast Food Packaging?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:43 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/toxins-in-fast-food-packaging-pfoa-pfos/ [https://perma.cc/HD8H-
ADLG]. 
 60. See Rich, supra note 56 (noting that PFOA, which was resistant to degradation, 
could increase the size of the liver in rats, rabbits, and dogs); see also Hawthorn, supra note 58; 
Tiffany Kary & Denise Trowbridge, Dupont, Chemours Handed Another Loss in Teflon Chemical 
Case, BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2016, 3:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-
06/dupont-loses-third-case-over-teflon-toxin-chemours-to-pay [https://perma.cc/R5P2-P2SP]; 
Kelly, supra note 59 (“Concerns about the potential toxicity of [PFOA] had been raised internally 
within DuPont by at least 1954, leading DuPont’s own researchers to conclude by at least 1961 
that [PFOA] was toxic and, according to DuPont’s own Toxicology Section Chief, should be 
‘handled with extreme care.’”). 
 61. See Kary & Trowbridge, supra note 60. 
 62. Rich, supra note 56. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Sharon Lerner, The Teflon Toxin: DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception, 
INTERCEPT (Aug. 11, 2015, 5:35 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/08/11/dupont-chemistry-
deception/ [https://perma.cc/89PM-XBGW]. 
 65. Hawthorn, supra note 58; Rich, supra note 56. 
 66. Kelly, supra note 59; Rich, supra note 56. 
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chemical waste facilities—DuPont discharged “hundreds of thousands 
of pounds of PFOA powder” into the Ohio River and stored “7,100 tons 
of PFOA-laced sludge” in its facility’s digestion ponds, “open, unlined 
pits . . . from which the chemical could seep into the ground.”67  As a 
result, PFOA entered the drinking water supply of over one hundred 
thousand people.68  By 1984, DuPont knew that drinking water across 
the Ohio River was contaminated.69   
However, the health risks were outweighed by the monetary 
rewards.  An internal document dated later in 1984 stated that while 
the “[l]egal and medical [departments] will likely take the position of 
total elimination,” the company executives concluded that cutting 
pollution was “not ‘economically attractive.’”70  Therefore, rather than 
reducing its use of PFOA, DuPont increased production.71  It also 
continued to keep the dangers related to PFOA exposure secret.72 
Additional studies echoed earlier warnings, yet DuPont 
continued to put its profit before public welfare.  In 1990, a study 
showed that 3M employees with long-term exposure to PFOA had 
higher rates of death from prostate cancer than employees who were 
not exposed.73  Internal documentation indicated that “DuPont 
understood that PFOA caused cancerous testicular, pancreatic and 
liver tumors in lab animals.”74  Rather than developing a less toxic or 
less risky alternative, DuPont decided to continue using PFOA.75  As 
the New York Times noted, “[t]he risk was too great” given that PFOA 
products were “worth $1 billion in annual profit.”76   
When its own safety limits were exceeded, the company 
remained silent and merely revised the safety limit so as to stay 
within the threshold.  In 1991, DuPont set an internal safety limit of 
 
 67. Rich, supra note 56. 
 68. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“By 2001, . . . [PFOA] had seeped into the water 
supply of at least six public water systems in West Virginia and Ohio.”). 
 69. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 7; see Hawthorn, supra note 58 
(reporting that an August 29, 1984 “personal and confidential” memorandum from DuPont 
stated that PFOA was found in drinking water on both sides of the Ohio River); Kary & 
Trowbridge, supra note 60; Kelly, supra note 59 (“In 1984, DuPont began to secretively collect 
local tap water, asking employees to bring in jugs of water from their own homes, schools, and 
local businesses, and discovered that [PFOA] was making its way into public drinking water 
supplies in both Ohio and West Virginia at potentially dangerous levels.”). 
 70. Kelly, supra note 59. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hawthorn, supra note 58. 
 74. Rich, supra note 56. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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one part per billion for PFOA concentration in drinking water.77  
However, DuPont later found that one local water district contained 
PFOA levels at three times that amount.78  At no time did DuPont 
notify regulators or the public.79  Instead, DuPont merely adopted a 
new threshold of 150 parts per billion.80   
Eight years later, in 1999, Robert Bilott filed a federal suit 
against DuPont on behalf of Wilbur Tennant, a farmer whose cattle 
were dying after drinking water near DuPont’s facility.81  During 
discovery Bilott uncovered fifty-year-old documents that indicated 
DuPont had long been aware of the dangers of PFOA.82  Thereafter, 
the parties settled for an undisclosed sum.83   
Although 3M ceased production of PFOA in 2000, DuPont 
continued to produce and use PFOA for another thirteen years.84  
During this time, a DuPont scientist stated in a 2001 email that 
“when airborne, [PFOA] is so hard to deal with that ‘it might require 
the public to wear gas masks.’”85   
Despite actual knowledge of PFOA’s toxicity and that its 
facilities had discharged PFOA into the surrounding drinking water, 
DuPont concealed this information from the public for fear that 
residents might seek to stop the company.86  Troubled by DuPont’s 
continuing concealment of this health hazard, Bilott sent a 972-page 
letter (along with 136 attached exhibits) to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) on March 6, 2001.87  In it, he urged the EPA 
 
 77. Id. (“In Little Hocking, the water tested positive for PFOA at seven times the 
limit.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“[A 2001 email by DuPont’s in-house counsel] 
shows that company officials planned to push regulators to allow the public to be exposed to 
higher levels of the chemical than DuPont itself had recommended. . . . [Counsel] wrote: ‘So far 
DuPont has been saying there are safe levels, we need to have an independent agency agree, we 
are hoping that it will agree to higher levels than we have been saying. If for no other reason 
than we are exceeding the levels we say we set as our own guideline, mostly because no one 
bothered to do air monitoring until now, and our water test has been completely inadequate.’”). 
 81. Rich, supra note 56; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“Within a few years, about 280 of 
Tennant’s cattle, which drank water from the creek, had died. When the Tennants cut open a 
cow to investigate the cause of its death, they discovered that its internal organs had turned 
bright, neon green . . . . Tennant and his family members, too, suffered breathing difficulties and 
cancers.”). 
 82. Rich, supra note 56. 
 83. Lerner, supra note 64. 
 84. Rich, supra note 56. 
 85. Kelly, supra note 59. 
 86. See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 12. 
 87. Rich, supra note 56. 
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to regulate PFOA immediately and provide clean water to affected 
persons.88   
This action opened a lengthy investigation by the EPA.89  In 
2004, the EPA filed a lawsuit against DuPont based on the company’s 
two-decade concealment of PFOA’s risks.90  In 2005, the EPA reached 
a $16.5 million settlement with DuPont for its failure to report such 
health risks.91  This settlement accounted for the highest civil penalty 
ever assessed by the EPA,92 yet the fine amounted to less than 2 
percent of DuPont’s profits from PFOA in that year alone.93  
Furthermore, DuPont was not required to immediately pull PFOA 
from the market.94  Despite the Ohio EPA’s classification of PFOA as a 
toxic air pollutant,95 DuPont and the federal EPA negotiated a 
voluntary phase-out by 2015.96   
The effects of DuPont’s decades-long use of PFOA had tragic 
consequences.  Between 1999 and 2012, PFOA was found in the blood 
samples of 99 percent of the US population.97  The chemical was 
“detected in water, wildlife, and humans worldwide.”98  Animal studies 
resulted in developmental defects, liver toxicity, kidney toxicity, 
immune defects, and cancer.99  Meanwhile, “[h]uman epidemiology 
data report associations between PFOA exposure and high cholesterol, 
increased liver enzymes, decreased vaccination response, thyroid 
disorders, pregnancy-induced hypertension and preeclampsia, and 
cancer (testicular and kidney).”100  According to the EPA, “a single 
exposure to a developmental toxin at a critical time in development 
can produce an adverse effect.”101  Further, the effects of short-term 
exposure can last for years and are exacerbated by additional 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Kelly, supra note 59. 
 91. Juliet Eilperin, DuPont, EPA Settle Chemical Complaint, WASH. POST  
(Dec. 15, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/14/ 
AR2005121402275.html [https://perma.cc/R6VU-9WGX]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Rich, supra note 56. 
 94. Kelly, supra note 59. 
 95. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 11. 
 96. Kelly, supra note 59. 
 97. EPA, DOC. NO. 822-R-16-005, DRINKING WATER HEALTH ADVISORY FOR 
PERFLUOROOCTANOIC ACID (PFOA) 9 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
05/documents/pfoa_health_advisory_final_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W56F-9F7M]. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. at 9, 35–39, 44–45; see also Rich, supra note 56. 
 100. EPA, supra note 97, at 9, 39–42, 45–46; see also Rich, supra note 56. 
 101. EPA, supra note 97, at 10. 
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exposures.102  As a result of these findings, the EPA issued a safety 
limit for PFOA of 0.07 micrograms per liter or 70 parts per trillion.103   
In December 2011, independent scientists began releasing their 
findings.104  They confirmed what DuPont had known for  
decades105—that “there was a ‘probable link’ between PFOA and 
kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, pre-
eclampsia and ulcerative colitis.”106   
Once these secrets were revealed, civil lawsuits were filed by 
those affected.  In October 2015, DuPont was found liable in the first 
of 3,535 personal-injury lawsuits.107  The jury awarded that plaintiff 
$1.6 million in damages.108  In July 2016, a second lawsuit against 
DuPont resulted in an award of $5.1 million in compensatory 
damages, along with $500,000 in punitive damages due to DuPont’s 
malice.109   
B. Vinyl Chloride  
Another toxic chemical—vinyl chloride—was processed into 
PVC plastic.110  PVC is used in a range of household and industrial 
products, “from raincoats and shower curtains to window frames and 
indoor plumbing.”111 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 9. One microgram per liter is equal to one part per billion. TERRIE K. BOGUSKI, 
CTR. FOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RESEARCH, BROWNFIELDS RESOURCES: UNDERSTANDING UNITS 
OF MEASURE 1 (2006), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.files/ 
fileID/14285 [https://perma.cc/22CF-AX2Q]. “A way to visualize one part per billion (ppb) in 
water is to think of it as one drop in one billion drops of water . . . .” Id. 
 104. Rich, supra note 56. 
 105. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 10–12 (“The toxic and hazardous 
nature of PFOA was confirmed by DuPont’s experts in August 2004: ‘the epidemiological and 
scientific literature . . . indicates . . . that there is a risk of adverse human health effects from 
exposure to [PFOA]’ including ‘liver disease or liver effects’ and ‘cancers,’ including ‘kidney 
cancer in particular, in those exposed to [PFOA].’ That expert noted ‘cholesterol abnormalities’ 
that suggested potential cardiovascular implications.” (citations omitted)). 
 106. Rich, supra note 56; see also Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 9–10. 
 107. Rich, supra note 56; see also Kelly, supra note 59. 
 108. Kary & Trowbridge, supra note 60; Kelly, supra note 59. 
 109. Jessica Dye, DuPont Must Pay Extra $500,000 in Lawsuit over Teflon-Making 
Chemical, REUTERS (July 8, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dupont-verdict-
idUSKCN0ZO21V [https://perma.cc/8J3R-AMF8]. 
 110. EPA, VINYL CHLORIDE 1 (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/vinyl-chloride.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3FL-Q7MG]; Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, 
supra note 54, at 10:56–11:10. 
 111. Polyvinyl Chloride: Chemical Compound, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/polyvinyl-chloride [https://perma.cc/H7EM-FQV3] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
2018] WHEN TRADE SECRECY GOES TOO FAR 1151 
Documents uncovered during a lawsuit in the 1990s indicate 
that the industry knew for decades that vinyl chloride was 
dangerous.112  For example, a May 1959 document to the Director of 
the Department of Industrial Hygiene at the BF Goodrich Company 
stated that “[w]e have been investigating vinyl chloride a bit. . . . We 
feel quite confident that 500 parts per million is going to produce 
rather appreciable injury when inhaled 7 hours a day, five days a 
week for an extended period.”113  Meanwhile, workers were being 
regularly exposed to at least 500 parts per million.114  Seven years 
later, an October 6, 1966, BF Goodrich memo stated that “[t]he clinical 
manifestations are such as to suggest the possibility of a disabling 
disease as a later development. . . . [The company is] worried about 
possible long term effect on body tissue especially if it proves to be 
systemic.”115  Yet the company continued to keep these dangers secret 
from its workforce.116   
BF Goodrich was not alone in keeping this information secret.  
Intercompany correspondence at Union Carbide, dated November 24, 
1959, stated that “[v]inyl chloride monomer is more toxic than has 
been believed.”117  Moreover, companies communicated with one 
another about these risks.  A communication from BF Goodrich to 
Union Carbide, Imperial Chemical, and Monsanto stated that “[t]here 
is no question that skin lesions, absorption of bone of the terminal 
joints of the hands, and circulatory changes can occur in workers 
associated with the polymerization of PVC. . . . Of course, the 
confidentiality of this data is exceedingly important.”118  Thus, the 
companies marked these documents “secret” and “confidential.”119  
And in the early 1970s—amid additional reports stating that “the 
results on rats are probably undeniable”120 and that “[a]ll agreed the 
results certainly indicate a positive carcinogenic effect above or at 250 
parts per million”121—European and US chemical companies signed an 
 
 112. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 6:58–11:39; see also Trade Secrets: 
The Documents, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/program/vinyl.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9D3L-3E3C] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (providing supporting documents to the documentary). 
 113. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 12:15–12:35. 
 114. Id. at 12:46–12:51. 
 115. Id. at 18:00–18:50. 
 116. Id. at 17:29–18:00. 
 117. Id. at 12:52–13:12. 
 118. Id. at 15:25–16:00. 
 119. See, e.g., id. at 28:00–28:30. 
 120. Id. (highlighting Union Carbide’s confidential internal correspondence, dated Feb. 
13, 1973). 
 121. Compare id. (highlighting Ethyl Corporation’s internal communications regarding 
vinyl chloride), with EPA, supra note 110, at 2 (“[The] EPA has established a Reference 
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agreement not to disclose the identity of their researchers to industry 
outsiders.122   
Even after the federal government, through its newly created 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
requested all health and safety information regarding vinyl chloride in 
1973,123 and a staff member of the industry’s trade association sent a 
letter to member companies urging that they tell NIOSH their 
findings, the industry did not provide such information to NIOSH.124  
Meanwhile, those working in vinyl choloride plants “were being told 
there was nothing to worry about, that there [was] no danger,” and 
that the industry would “protect the work force.”125  Instead, the 
companies paid the scientists to come to the conclusions the 
companies wanted,126 thus corrupting the research.127  Rather than 
studying the workers who were most directly exposed, the scientists 
evaluated the workers on the margin of the process.128  Therefore, “[i]n 
the end, the industry got a report that said what it wanted,”129 proving 
that “[s]cience is easy to manipulate.”130 
 
  
 
Concentration (RfC) of 0.1 milligrams per cubic meter, and a Reference Dose (RfD) of 0.003 
milligrams per kilogram per day for vinyl chloride.”). 
 122. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 27:07–27:23. 
 123. Id. at 28:43–29:05. 
 124. See id. at 29:08–30:03 (reporting that an industry trade association letter to member 
companies, dated March 26, 1973, stated: “There is the aspect of moral obligation not to withhold 
from the Government significant information having occupational and environmental  
relevance. . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 32:30–32:48. 
 126. Id. at 36:00–36:26. 
 127. Id. at 36:26–36:46. 
 128. Id. at 36:45–37:40. 
 129. Id. at 40:10–40:14. 
 130. Id. at 40:06–40:08. 
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The EPA now states that 
[a]cute (short-term) exposure to high levels of vinyl chloride in air has resulted in 
central nervous system effects (CNS), such as dizziness, drowsiness, and headaches 
in humans.  Chronic (long-term) exposure to vinyl chloride through inhalation and 
oral exposure in humans has resulted in liver damage.  Cancer is a major concern 
from exposure to vinyl chloride via inhalation, as vinyl chloride exposure has been 
shown to increase the risk of a rare form of liver cancer in humans.  EPA has 
classified vinyl chloride as a Group A, human carcinogen.131 
While workers’ compensation was available to shield corporations 
from suits by employees, no such mechanism was available to shield 
corporations from suits by consumers.132  This possibility of unlimited 
liability gave the industry pause with regard to use of vinyl chloride in 
aerosols.133  As a result, companies began phasing out their use of 
such products.  However, they did so quietly; “[n]o public warning was 
issued.”134  Thus, it is impossible to determine the number of 
hairdressers and their customers who were sickened or died as a 
result of exposure to vinyl chloride.135   
In 1974, after a number of employees died from angiosarcoma 
(a cancer of the liver), and over industry objections, the government 
reduced permissible workplace exposure to vinyl chloride to one part 
per million.136  Because the companies were able to keep the dangers 
of vinyl chloride secret for fifteen years, they were able to keep making 
money on these products despite the clear dangers posed to public 
health.   
C. Benzene 
The American Cancer Society describes benzene as “a colorless, 
flammable liquid with a sweet odor,” which “evaporates quickly when 
 
 131. EPA, supra note 110, at 1. 
 132. See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 43:45–44:10 (referring to a 
Union Carbide internal correspondence as stating, “[i]f vinyl chloride proves to be hazardous to 
health, a producing company’s liability to its employees is limited by various Workmen’s 
Compensation laws”). 
 133. See id. at 44:51–45:20 (quoting an Ethyl Corporation interoffice memorandum that 
states Dow “is questioning the aspect of making sales of vinyl chloride monomer when the known 
end use is as an aerosol propellant since [the] market is small but potential liability is great”); id. 
at 45:22–45:37 (quoting an Allied Chemical Corporation memorandum’s admonition that “serious 
consideration should be given to withdrawal from” the market for vinyl chloride monomer as 
aerosol propellant); id. at 43:14–43:45 (quoting a BF Goodrich Chemical Company memorandum 
dated March 24, 1969: “Calculations have been made to show the concentration of propellant in a 
typical small hair dresser’s room. . . . All of this suggests that beauty operators may be exposed 
to concentrations of vinyl chloride monomer equal to or greater than the level in our polys.”). 
 134. Id. at 46:32–46:41. 
 135. Id. at 46:43–46:58. 
 136. Id. at 47:06–47:26, 49:49–49:58. 
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exposed to air.”137  It is primarily used as a reagent for synthesizing 
other chemicals, “including plastics, lubricants, rubbers, dyes, 
detergents, drugs, and pesticides.”138  Historically, it was also used as 
an industrial solvent—to “dissolve or extract other substances”—and 
as a gasoline additive.139   
“[A]s with vinyl chloride, the industry’s own medical officers 
had known of benzene’s toxicity for a very long time.”140  In 1948, the 
American Petroleum Institute’s toxicology profile of benzene 
“discussed ‘reasonably well documented instances of the development 
of leukemia as a result of chronic benzene exposure,’ cautioning that 
‘the only absolutely safe concentration . . . is zero.’”141  This was echoed 
in 1958 by Esso Oil’s medical research division, which stated that 
“[m]ost authorities agree the only level which can be considered 
absolutely safe for prolonged exposure is zero.”142  The industry 
response was to shield internal records, disclosing them only on court 
order.143   
Subsequent lawsuits uncovered a trove of secret documents 
detailing the industry’s campaign to undercut outside scientific 
investigations.144  Indeed, the industry spent over $36 million on 
counterresearch to protect its own economic interests.145  As a former 
employee and whistleblower explained, “[i]t’s all about influencing 
science to get what industry wants.”146  In this regard, benzene is “a 
 
 137. Benzene and Cancer Risk, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/ 
cancercauses/othercarcinogens/intheworkplace/benzene [https://perma.cc/A9JT-QFR2] (last 
updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 138. Id.; accord Lombardi, supra note 56. 
 139. Benzene and Cancer Risk, supra note 137. 
 140. See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 52:52–53:02; see also STEEL, 
supra note 53, at 71 (“Reports of benzene causing aplastic anemia date to 1897, while the first 
studies linking benzene to leukemia date to 1928. In the US, effective regulations on benzene 
were not introduced until 1977, and implementation of these regulations were delayed a decade 
further due to litigation.”). 
 141. Lombardi, supra note 56. 
 142. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 53:03–53:27 (quoting a 1958 Esso 
Oil memorandum). 
 143. Lombardi, supra note 56. 
 144. The American Petroleum Institute challenged the National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
study “from every conceivable angle,” creating sufficient doubt regarding that study to persuade 
the EPA not to rely on the NCI’s research in 2000. Id.  
 145. Id. In advance of the industry’s studies, anticipated results were laid out: “[p]rovide 
strong scientific support for a lack of a risk of leukemia[;] . . . [e]stablish . . . current occupational 
exposure limits do not create a significant risk[; and] [r]efute the allegation that Non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma can be induced by benzene exposure.” Id. 
 146. Id. (reporting a statement made by Mobil’s former chief toxicologist, Myron 
Mehlman, “who became a whistleblower in 1989 after the company fired him for complaining 
about benzene levels in its gasoline. He sued Mobil, winning a $7 million judgment.”); see also 
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good example of how the general scientific literature is being polluted 
by people working for industry.”147 
Even “as evidence mounted connecting benzene to leukemia,” 
the industry continued to challenge and delay regulations from going 
into effect.148  Rather than changing its behavior, the petrochemical 
industry turned to the courts to impede regulatory reform,149 arguing 
that reduction of benzene exposure would be “too costly.”150  
Benzene is now a known human carcinogen.151  As of May 2014, 
the EPA “estimated that 5 million Americans—not counting those 
with workplace exposures—face heightened cancer risks from benzene 
and 68 other carcinogens spewed into the air by . . . the nation’s 149 
oil refineries.”152  Countless lawsuits have been (and are still being) 
filed. 
Money clearly motivated this ongoing secrecy, despite the 
repeated findings that such chemicals posed a danger to public 
health.153  These companies wanted to continue making profits on the 
products as they existed.  They did not want to invest in research and 
development to change the process or product in a manner that would 
reduce or remove such dangers, and they did not want to be held 
 
Morris, supra note 53 (detailing Georgia Pacific’s research program and publication of articles to 
cast doubt on others’ scientific research regarding the dangers of asbestos exposure). 
 147. Lombardi, supra note 56 (reporting a statement made by Peter Infante, “a former 
director of the office that reviews health standards at the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, who has studied the pollutant for 40 years”). 
 148. See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 51:36–51:54 (“[T]he 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration—OSHA—ordered that workplace exposure be 
lowered to one part per million—a regulation the industry, then producing 11 billion pounds a 
year, would challenge.”). 
 149. See Lombardi, supra note 56 (“[Industry-financed scientific reports] play[ed] a 
critical role in the benzene litigation, . . . . help[ing] companies deny liability by casting doubt on 
causation, the central issue in a toxic-tort lawsuit.”). 
 150. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 54:20–54:35 (“The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in New Orleans—in America’s petrochemical heartland—ruled that the 
government had not proved the danger to humans to be great enough to justify the cost to 
industry.”). 
 151. EPA, TOXICITY AND EXPOSURE ASSESSMENTS FOR CHILDREN’S HEALTH 1 (2009), 
https://archive.epa.gov/region5/teach/web/pdf/benz_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5RF-VB5R]; 
Benzene and Cancer Risk, supra note 137; Lombardi, supra note 56. 
 152. Lombardi, supra note 56. 
 153. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12 (“[T]hese companies were concerned not with 
public health but with avoiding responsibility for the harm they caused.”); Richards, supra note 
53 (“Now we know what they knew and did, and that was to try to put a lid on the whole thing 
and keep on making money.”); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 1:04:27–1:04:44 
(showing a portion of an interview with Jacqueline Warren, a former attorney for the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, who stated that companies are “interested in their bottom line, their 
stockholders, their product, and they’re not as interested at all in what the potential health or 
safety or environmental effect of exposure to this might be”). 
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publicly or monetarily accountable for the resultant injuries to their 
employees, customers, or the neighboring public and environment.  In 
light of such historical trade secret abuse and the continuing 
monetary motivation, suspicion that companies continue to engage in 
such immoral practices remains.  Such suspicion is not misplaced.  As 
veteran journalist Bill Moyers observed in his Trade Secrets report, 
“[w]e think we are protected but, in fact, chemicals are presumed 
safe—innocent—until proven guilty.”154   
V. CURRENT EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE 
As discussed above, the chemical revolution of the past sixty 
years has produced thousands of man-made chemicals that have not 
been tested for their effect on the public’s health and safety.  Each 
week, we are bombarded with new products and processes.  Indeed, 
“an average of twenty new chemicals enter the marketplace every 
week,”155 and 80 percent of processed foods and a large percentage of 
fresh foods are now genetically modified.156  Unfortunately, consumers 
do not know much about what impact these materials will have on 
human beings or the environment. 157  Consumers are, essentially, 
acting as test subjects.   
Hydraulic fracturing and genetically modified foods, discussed 
in depth below, are two current examples of trade secrets that pose 
potential dangers to human health.  Other areas of current concern 
include synthetic fragrances,158 cosmetics,159 e-cigarettes,160 and flame 
 
 154. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 0:33–0:40; see also Alissa Cordner, 
Why Chemicals in the U.S. Are Still “Innocent Until Proven Guilty”, SMITHSONIAN (July 18, 
2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-chemicals-us-are-still-innocent-until-
proven-guilty-180959818/ [https://perma.cc/Q2TY-YPLE]. 
 155. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 1:14:35–1:14:40 (emphasis added). 
 156. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 20; see Margie Kelly, Top 7 Genetically Modified Crops, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 5:05 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/margie-
kelly/genetically-modified-food_b_2039455.html [https://perma.cc/LT74-7C93]. 
 157. See Kelly, supra note 59 (“With no mandatory safety testing for the vast majority of 
the tens of thousands of chemicals used daily in America, doctors and public health officials have 
little information to guide them as they seek to identify potential health hazards . . . .”). 
 158. See Brian Brinks, Why Do We Call a Spritz of Chemicals an “Air Freshener”?, LIFE 
OF BRIAN: ENVTL. & SUSTAINABLE LIVING BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.lifeofbrian.ca/ 
index.php/2010/10/why-call-a-spritz-of-chemicals-an-air-freshener/ [https://perma.cc/7E7U-H3ZJ] 
(“Most Shampoos, soaps, perfume/colognes, cosmetics, detergents, fabric softeners, cleaners, 
candles . . . etc[.], contain synthetic ‘fragrance.’ [Yet,] the true chemical makeup of ‘fragrance’ is 
tightly protected as a ‘trade secret.’”). 
 159. See “Trade Secret” Ingredients, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/Labeling/ 
ucm414211.htm [https://perma.cc/UQ8J-YYLH] (last updated Nov. 4, 2017) (“FDA requires 
cosmetics to have an ‘ingredient declaration,’ a list of all the product’s ingredients. . . . [However,] 
fragrance and flavor ingredients do not need to be listed individually on cosmetic labels, because 
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retardants.161  Although concerning, those products are not discussed 
in detail within this Article.   
Business records that hide nefarious activity—such as 
mortgage lending practices,162 emissions records,163 donation 
expenditures,164 and safety protocols165—are also capable of being 
 
they are the ingredients most likely to be ‘trade secrets.’ Instead, they may be listed simply as 
‘fragrance’ or ‘flavor.’”). 
 160. See Don Hopey, New Rules Ban Sale of E-Cigs to Minors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
(May 5, 2016, 9:01 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/health/2016/05/05/FDA-brings-e-
cigarettes-under-federal-authority-electronic-cigarettes-regulations/stories/201605050181 
[https://perma.cc/VA4E-RYZ5] (“[B]ecause e-cigarettes are so new . . . it’s too soon to know their 
long-term health impacts; studies, however, show the aerosol vapor can contain known carcinogens, 
respiratory irritants and volatile organic compounds, including benzene, toluene and styrene.”). 
 161. See Michael Hawthorn, Firemaster 550 the Latest Flame Retardant Allowed onto 
Market Without Thorough Study, CHI. TRIB. (May 10, 2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-met-flames-regulators-20120510-story.html [https://perma.cc/5UED-QH6V] (“When 
Firemaster 550 replaced penta, its chemical makeup was a mystery to all but the manufacturer 
and a select group of EPA employees who were sworn to secrecy. That made it difficult for 
outside scientists to identify its ingredients in the environment and determine if they are 
harmful. . . . Chemtura already is marketing an alternative flame retardant called Emerald NH-
1. . . . The company says the polymer-based substance doesn’t contain bromine or chlorine, . . . . 
[b]ut the ingredients remain a trade secret.”); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.20(a), 20.21(a), 20.61(c), 
20.82(b), 20.111(c)(2), 20.111(d), 20.113(a) (2018). 
 162. See Jennifer Liberto, Fed to Release Wall Street Crisis Loan Data,  
CNN: MONEY (Mar. 21, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/21/news/economy/ 
fed_contracts_open_records/ [https://perma.cc/A5VK-69W7] (“Bloomberg LP, owner of Bloomberg 
News, had filed the lawsuit seeking details on a program that gave banks access to cheap loans 
in 2008. The Fed had originally refused to release the data, citing exemptions in open records 
laws for trade secrets.”). 
 163. See Volkswagen Case: Could Cheating on an Emissions Test Become a Protected 
Trade Secret?, JULIA REDA (Sept. 10, 2015), https://juliareda.eu/2015/10/volkswagen-trade-
secrets/ [https://perma.cc/87R2-VGYD] (“The European Parliament is currently negotiating the 
Trade Secret Directive in trilogue. In this week’s plenary session I called on my colleagues: We 
must be very careful not to include in that Directive new lines of defense for companies’ dirty 
secrets.”). 
 164. See Arit John, Red Cross Refuses to Disclose Full Details of Hurricane Sandy 
Spending, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/06/red-cross-refuses-
to-disclose-details-of-hurricane-sandy-spending/373583/ [https://perma.cc/3X4N-K8A8]; Rob 
Shwarts & Vann Pearce, DONATE, DON’T TELL? The Red Cross Says It Has Trade Secrets, 
Upsetting Activists, ORRICK: TRADE SECRETS WATCH (July 17, 2014), 
http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2014/07/17/donate-dont-tell-the-red-cross-says-it-has-
trade-secrets-upsetting-activists/ [https://perma.cc/DL48-P4JR] (reporting that the Red Cross 
argued that “information on how the Red Cross spent Hurricane Sandy relief donations” 
qualified as “trade secrets exempt from New York’s Freedom of Information Law”); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Red Cross Claims Some Hurricane Sandy Spending Information Is a Trade 
Secret, A.B.A. J. (June 30, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
red_cross_claims_some_hurricane_sandy_spending_information [https://perma.cc/2F8W-FLQA] 
(“[The Red Cross’s counsel] argued that information about fundraising, internal operations and 
finances should be exempt from disclosure. If the information were released, . . . ‘the American 
Red Cross would suffer competitive harm because its competitors would be able to mimic the 
American Red Cross’s business model for an increased competitive advantage.’”). 
1158 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 20:4:1135 
protected as trade secrets, which may result in monetary harm to 
others.  This Article, however, focuses on those trade secrets that 
cause direct or indirect physical harm to people.   
A. Hydraulic Fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” involves the injection of 
millions of gallons of fluid into shale beds at high pressure in order to 
force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas.166  In 2015, there 
were three hundred thousand fracking wells in the United States, up 
from twenty-three thousand in the year 2000.167   
While 99 percent of fracking fluid is composed of water and 
sand, gas drillers add hundreds of chemicals to the mixture.168  Many 
of these chemicals are classified as known or possible human 
carcinogens.169  
Studies indicate that fracking results in adverse health effects 
to humans and livestock.170  People exposed have experienced 
 
 165. See Jessica Mendelson, A Whale of a Trade Secret . . . or Not?, SEYFARTH SHAW: 
TRADING SECRETS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/12/articles/trade-
secrets/a-whale-of-a-trade-secret-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/7C6N-JRCF]; Mark Patrick, 
Seaworld’s Killer Whale Safety Protocols Withheld as Trade Secret, AM. U.: INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 
(Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.ipbrief.net/2013/10/27/seaworlds-killer-whale-safety-protocols-
withheld-as-trade-secret/ [https://perma.cc/6C7L-RCFX]. 
 166. See ALEX PRUD’HOMME, HYDROFRACKING: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 2 
(2014). 
 167. Matt Egan, Fracking Fallout: 7.9 Million at Risk of Man-Made Earthquakes, CNN: 
MONEY (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/29/investing/earthquakes-
fracking-usgs-oil-gas/ [https://perma.cc/GQA4-2WYX]. 
 168. See JOHN LOCKE FOUND., SPOTLIGHT NO. 460, THE CHEMICALS IN FRACKING FLUIDS: 
EARTH AND WATER, YOU’LL FIND PLENTY OF BOTH DOWN THERE 2 (2014), 
https://www.johnlocke.org/app/uploads/2016/06/Spotlight460ChemicalsinFrackingFluids.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XR93-HXFR]; see also JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE LAW OF FRACKING § 10:11, at 
110–11 (2015) (“[C]ompanies reported using more than 2,500 products containing 750 chemicals 
and other components [between 2005 and 2009]—in a quarter of the products were chemicals 
classified as ‘known or possible human carcinogens,’ which could have been regulated under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, or listed as hazardous air pollutants.”). 
 169. See O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:11, at 110–11; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 
83 (citing OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), https://www.energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVY9-865W]) (“While 
some of the chemicals are common and benign—sodium chloride (used in table salt), borate salts 
(used in cosmetics), or guar gum (used to make ice cream)—others contain toxic additives—such 
as benzene (a carcinogen) or the solvent 2-Butoxyethanol, known as 2-BE. While they comprise a 
tiny percentage of the mixture, hazardous exposure to some of these chemicals is measured in 
the parts per million.”). 
 170. See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 85 (stating that forty of the chemicals used in 
fracking “had ‘the potential to cause multiple adverse health effects,’ and 19 . . . cause 
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“burning of the eyes/nose/throat, headaches, rashes, nosebleeds, and 
gastrointestinal distress,” as well as upper-respiratory problems, 
“confusion,” “extreme fatigue . . . and sensory deficits.”171  Livestock 
and pets exposed to fracking chemicals have died or been sickened and 
have encountered reproductive defects.172  Moreover, exposed livestock 
“are not tested for chemical contaminants before slaughter,” where 
they then enter the food supply.173 
In addition to the increase in earthquakes that appear related 
to fracking,174 the process has had many deleterious effects on the 
environment.  For example, “wastewater is frequently sent to 
treatment plants that were not designed to treat it.”175  Two hundred 
eighty billion gallons of wastewater were created in 2012 alone.176  
Groundwater contamination has also occurred.177  Moreover, fracking 
 
‘deleterious effects on the environment’” (quoting OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY 
TECH. LAB., supra note 169)). 
 171. O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:12, at 114 (citing Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. 
Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 NEW SOLUTIONS 51, 51–77 
(2012)); see also id. § 10:1, at 102 (“Some of these chemicals are very hazardous in deep rock 
layers, as well as on the surface while being pumped, and their unintended effects on humans on 
the surface can be a persistent problem for those living nearby.”). 
 172. Id. § 10:12, at 113 (citing Bamberger & Oswald, supra note 171, at 51–77). 
 173. Id. § 10:12, at 114. 
 174. See Egan, supra note 167 (reporting that seismic activity is on the rise in certain 
energy-intensive states after a relatively stable thirty-year period); see also Jessica Fitzpatrick & 
Mark Petersen, Induced Earthquakes Raise Chances of Damaging Shaking in 2016, USGS (Mar. 
28, 2016, 12:46 PM), https://www2.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/induced-earthquakes-
raise-chances-of-damaging-shaking-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/U4JD-7Q5P]. 
 175. O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:13, at 116–17; see also Ian Urbina, EPA Steps Up 
Scrutiny of Pollution in Pennsylvania Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/science/earth/08water.html [https://perma.cc/9Y9G-S722]; 
Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04gas.html [https://perma.cc/TB4N-ERAK]; Ian Urbina, 
Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/PB6X-YJ2F]. 
 176. See O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:12, at 112 (citing Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas 
Monthly Supply and Disposition Balance, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_sum_sndm_s1_m.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z6C-U4PH] (last 
updated Mar. 30, 2018)). 
 177. See id.; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 76 (citing Amy Mall, Incidents Where 
Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of Drinking Water Contamination, NRDC: EXPERT 
BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amy-mall/incidents-where-hydraulic-
fracturing-suspected-cause-drinking-water-contamination [https://perma.cc/F36K-Q2JR]) (“In 
the United States, hydrofracking is suspected in at least 36 cases of groundwater contamination, 
and in several cases EPA has determined that it was the likely source of pollution.”). 
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has been linked “to unhealthy levels of smog and toxic air 
contaminants.”178   
Despite these harms, gas drillers have refused to disclose what 
chemicals are used, claiming disclosure would instruct others on how 
to use a similar combination in a similar shale bed.179  While that 
know-how is likely to have value,180 the resulting damage to public 
health is unacceptable.181   
Unfortunately, hydraulic fracturing is exempt from all of the 
environmental laws that would normally protect the public and the 
environment—namely, the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the 
Safe Drinking Water Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
 
 178. NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, FRACKING FUMES: AIR POLLUTION FROM HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING THREATENS PUBLIC HEALTH AND COMMUNITIES 2 (2014), 
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/fracking-air-pollution-IB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S7D-
6X4A]; see also EPA, OVERVIEW OF FINAL AMENDMENTS TO AIR REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND 
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET 3 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/natural_gas_transmission_fact_sheet_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL2Y-G9X4] 
(“The oil and gas industry is a significant source of VOCs, which contribute to the formation of 
ground-level ozone (smog). . . . [S]ome of the largest air emissions in the natural gas industry 
occur as natural gas wells that have been fractured are being prepared for production. During a 
stage of well completion known as ‘flowback,’ fracturing fluids, water, and reservoir gas come to 
the surface at a high velocity and volume. This mixture includes a high volume of VOCs and 
methane, along with air toxics such as benzene, ethylbenzene and n-hexane. The typical 
flowback process lasts from three to 10 days. Pollution also is emitted from other processes and 
equipment in the industry that prepare gas for sale and that assist in moving it through 
pipelines.”); PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND YOUR HEALTH: 
AIR CONTAMINATION, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/fracking-and-air-pollution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3T8H-3G3B] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 179. O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:1, at 102 (citing Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic 
Fracturing: Two Thirds of Frack Disclosures Omit ‘Secrets’, E&E NEWS (Sept. 26, 2012), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970474 [https://perma.cc/8TP8-5RTY]); see id. § 10:11, at 111 
(“[In a 2011 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce report,] some 
oil and gas companies stated they did not have access to proprietary information about chemicals 
they bought directly from suppliers: ‘In these cases, the companies are injecting fluids containing 
chemicals that they themselves cannot identify.’” (quoting MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (2011))); 
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 83–84. 
 180. See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01 (“The definition [of trade secret] includes 
information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of 
lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could be of 
great value to a competitor.”); O’REILLY, supra note 168, §§ 10:1–10:2, at 102–03 (“Halliburton 
claimed that disclosure of its secret chemical formulas would cost it $375 million. . . . One might 
presume that trial and error with differing levels and types of chemical ingredients has  
costs . . . . Knowing what will work or what has not worked is ‘know-how’ that has an inchoate 
value.”). 
 181. O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:3, at 104 (“The federal laws can allow a federal 
agency over-ride of a company’s claim of confidential status for its chemicals. The health and 
safety for the persons exposed to the mixture of chemicals may be in jeopardy. This risk scenario 
is a sufficient reason why the identities of chemicals should be disclosed.” (citations omitted)). 
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Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (or “Superfund”); the National Environmental Policy Act; 
and the Toxic Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act.182  This leaves the United States with 
a “patchwork” of state disclosure requirements, many of which offer 
little—if any—protection to the public.183   
In February 2014, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
advised the full disclosure of chemicals, proposing that companies 
could publicly disclose all chemicals without revealing the exact 
formula.  In this regard, several companies have listed chemicals on 
the industry website FracFocus.org.184  In October 2014,  
Houston-based oil-field service company Baker Hughes began listing 
all of the chemicals it uses, without detailing specific percentages or 
amounts.185  The company’s chief strategy officer explained that  
 
 182. William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the 
United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government and Varying State 
Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 43 (2012) (citing RENEE LEWIS KOSNIK, EARTHWORKS, THE 
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY’S EXCLUSIONS AND EXEMPTIONS TO MAJOR  
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 2 (2007), https://earthworks.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/files/ 
publications/PetroleumExemptions1c.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS85-2FNX]); see also PRUD’HOMME, 
supra note 166, at 70, 107 (“[W]hen the [Department of Interior] issued a new set of hotly 
anticipated rules governing hydrofracking on public lands in May 2013, environmentalists were 
dismayed. The new rules continue to allow energy companies to keep certain fracking chemicals 
secret . . . .”). 
 183. PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 84 (citing Abraham Lustgarten, Natural Gas 
Drilling Is at a Crucial Turning Point, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:09 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/21/natural-gas-drilling-turning-point 
[https://perma.cc/EP2S-BNBM]). In Ohio, for example, the state fracking disclosure law 
“prohibits anyone from accessing information about ‘trade secret’ fracking chemicals except the 
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) or doctors treating a specific patient.” See 
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:14, at 119 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.10 et seq. (West 
2015)). However, neither the ODNR nor doctors are allowed to share that information with 
others, including those exposed. Id. “In Texas, legislators passed the nation’s first rules requiring 
public disclosure of fracking chemicals.” See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 96 (citing Jennifer 
Hiller, Frackers Avoid Fluid Disclosure Despite New Law, STATESMAN (Feb. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/frackers-avoid-fluid-disclosure-despite-new-
law/nWHKZ/ [https://perma.cc/Q3KZ-WQHY]). While the rules were designed to promote 
transparency, that was not the result. See id. “Between April 2011 and early December 2012, 
Texas drillers used terms such as ‘secret,’ ‘confidential,’ or ‘proprietary’ 10,120 times out of the 
12,410 hydraulic fractures reported . . . .” Id. 
 184. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TASK FORCE REPORT ON 
FRACFOCUS 2.0, at 2 (2014), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f8/FracFocus% 
20TF%20Report%20Final%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPV-CX65]; see REBECCA FELIX, 12 
THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT FRACKING 14–15 (2015); see also FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/FAD3-865M] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).   
 185. Eric Killelea, Baker Hughes Next to Disclose Formula, WILLISTON HERALD  
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.willistonherald.com/news/baker-hughes-next-to-disclose-formula/ 
article_9bfd3616-4a5d-11e4-9bcd-97c1e2811492.html [https://perma.cc/9W7T-7DGT]. 
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[i]ntroducing greater transparency about the chemicals used in the hydraulic 
fracturing process and protecting the ability to innovate are not conflicting  
goals. . . .  [Disclosure] is consistent with our belief that we are partners in solving 
industry challenges, and that we have a responsibility to provide the public with 
the information they want and deserve.  It simultaneously enables us to protect 
proprietary information that is critical to our growth.186 
Yet the industry continues to lobby the EPA to protect trade 
secrets by not requiring companies to reveal substances used in 
fracking, arguing that “[h]ydraulic fracturing is a highly complex and 
competitive industry where trade secrets are critical assets.”187  As a 
result, trade secrecy continues to impede the public’s consideration of 
what appears to be a hazard to the health of humans, animals, and 
the environment.   
B. Genetically Modified Organisms 
[A]s food has become more complicated, the balance between trade secrets and 
public disclosure has become more complicated.  On one hand, manufacturers must 
maintain trade secrets to protect their investments.  On the other hand, consumers 
want to know what ingredients are in food products, as well as how those 
ingredients are made.188   
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are organisms whose 
genetic material has been altered using genetic engineering 
techniques.189  Similarly, genetically modified foods are “plants and 
animals that have had their genetic makeup artificially altered . . . to 
make them grow faster, taste better, provide more nutrients, or last 
longer.”190  This is done by transposing the DNA of one organism—a 
plant, animal, or bacterium—with another “in order to change the 
condition or character of the receiving organism.”191 
There are three agencies involved in the regulation of 
genetically modified foods: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. US Chemical Manufacturers Lobby for Fracking Formula Secrecy, CHEMICALWATCH 
(Sept. 30, 2014), https://chemicalwatch.com/21344/us-chemical-manufacturers-lobby-for-fracking-
formula-secrecy [https://perma.cc/6J6C-933B]. 
 188. Kelly Damewood, Food Ingredients: Trade Secrets vs. Public Disclosure, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/03/food-ingredients-trade-
secrets-versus-public-disclosure/#.VritXfkrJD8 [https://perma.cc/92U2-CVZA]. 
 189. See Julie Hill, The Precautionary Principle and Release of Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOS) to the Environment, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 172, 
174 (Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994). 
 190. KEVIN HILLSTROM, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 8 (2012). 
 191. Id. 
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the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the EPA.192  The FDA is 
charged with regulating GMOs that become food or drugs,193 the 
USDA is charged with regulating GMOs that are existing crops,194 and 
the EPA is charged with regulating genetically modified pesticide 
products.195  “All three agencies operate passively under a ‘don’t tell, 
don’t look’ policy.”196  Under this policy, the government investigates 
potential risks only after the industry first discloses them.197   
The majority of Americans think the FDA does premarket 
safety testing.198  It does not.199  In 1992, the FDA decided to consider 
all genetically engineered food, prior to being studied, to be generally 
regarded as safe (GRAS).200  Therefore, neither premarket testing nor 
FDA approval is required before sale of GMO foods.201  Moreover, 
 
 192. See KERRY H. WHITESIDE, PRECAUTIONARY POLITICS: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN 
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 14 (2006); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified 
Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. 859, 876 (2011). 
 193. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12–13. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 13. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. at 14. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See HILLSTROM, supra note 190, at 18; see also CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14 (“If 
something can be ‘generally regarded as safe’ (GRAS) under the act, as most conventional foods 
are, then it is not regulated. Dr. Michael Hansen of Consumers Union says that the 
extraordinary decision by the FDA to consider all genetically engineered food, prior to being 
studied, to be GRAS weakens consumer safety requirements, because manufacturers no longer 
have to establish the safety of these products before selling them.”); Rowe, supra note 192, at 
879–80; Erin Quinn & Chris Young, Why the FDA Has Never Looked at Some of the Additives in 
Our Food, NPR: SALT (Apr. 14, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/ 
2015/04/14/399591292/why-the-fda-is-clueless-about-some-of-the-additives-in-our-food 
[https://perma.cc/V23M-VD8S] (“Companies have added thousands of ingredients to foods with 
little to no government oversight. That’s thanks to a loophole in a decades-old law that allows 
them to deem an additive to be ‘generally recognized as safe’—or GRAS—without the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration’s blessing, or even its knowledge. The loophole was originally intended 
to allow manufacturers of common ingredients like vinegar and table salt—when added to 
processed foods—to bypass the FDA’s lengthy safety-review process. But over time, companies 
have found that it’s far more efficient to take advantage of the exemption to get their products on 
shelves quickly. Some of these products contain additives that the FDA has found to pose 
dangers.”). 
 201. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14–17 (“[T]he companies only engage in a 
voluntary and informal ‘consultation process’ with the FDA. As a result, the GMOs that are on 
grocery store shelves today have never been tested for human health hazards. . . . A peer-
reviewed paper published in 2004 examined nearly one hundred sources, including regulatory 
documents and unpublished studies by industry, and concluded that approval in the United 
States is ‘a rubber-stamp process’ designed to ‘increase public confidence in, but not ensure the 
safety of, genetically engineered foods.’”); see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 15; Rowe, supra 
note 192, at 879–80 (“[N]either premarket testing nor FDA approval is required before 
genetically modified plant foods are sold to consumers.”). 
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labels are not required202 because GMO foods are not considered by 
the FDA to be “substantially different from their conventional 
counterparts.”203   
No one, including insurers,204 wants to take responsibility for 
the safety of GMOs.  The FDA claims that “it is the food producer who 
is responsible for assuring safety.”205  Meanwhile, Monsanto states 
that it “should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food.  Our 
interest is in selling as much of it as possible.  Assuring its safety is 
the FDA’s job.”206 
The agrochemical and agrobiotech industries are a political 
force, ever-increasing in power.207  Monsanto and other agrochemical 
or agrobiotech companies, like Dow, DuPont, and Syngenta, all have 
“a long history in the chemical business and a lot of experience 
avoiding government regulation.”208  Based on successful lobbying 
efforts, the industry was able to effectively exempt itself from the 
“most important environmental and consumer protection laws.”209  Yet 
 
 202. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16 (“Even though public-opinion polls repeatedly 
show that well over 90 percent of Americans want labels on genetically engineered foods, those 
labels are not allowed.”). 
 203. Rowe, supra note 192, at 879–80; see also CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 15 (“Early 
on, [agencies] made a preemptive decision to approve all GMOs on the basis of a concept known 
as ‘substantial equivalence.’ The biotechnology industry created a blanket exemption for its 
products by simply declaring, without any scientific basis, that those products were the same as 
their natural counterparts.”); WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 16 (“Having found GM food to be 
‘substantially equivalent’ to conventionally grown food, the FDA argues that there is no need for 
it to carry out an assessment of every GM food product.”). 
 204. See WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 51 (“It is a powerful indication that we are not in 
the domain of traditional risk management when insurers refuse to cover the potential damages 
from transgenic crops, claiming that too little is known about their effects for them to calculate 
coverage.”). 
 205. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at 20 (“Responsibility for the lack of meaningful regulation lies with the 
agrochemical companies, with the regulators, and with those scientists who from the beginning 
wanted to avoid public scrutiny. . . . Their decision to regulate themselves facilitated the 
industry’s success with politicians, who were then easily persuaded to go along with self-
regulation.”); WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 96 (“The industry shapes its own regulatory 
environment.”). 
 208. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12 (“The dismantling of the U.S. regulatory system was 
a key element in the agrochemical industry’s successful strategy to impose GMOs on the 
marketplace. Much of the controversy surrounding genetically engineered plants can be 
attributed to the fact that they are not effectively regulated and the public has no way of 
knowing whether or not they are safe. Agrobiotechnology has been commercialized by companies 
like Dow, DuPont, Syngenta, and Monsanto, all of which have a long history in the chemical 
business and a lot of experience avoiding government regulation.”); see also WHITESIDE, supra 
note 192, at 16 (“The whole process of designing regulatory structures was closed to the public 
and largely shaped by the very industry that was to be regulated.”). 
 209. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16. 
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many trade secret owners have previously shown themselves not to be 
concerned with public health, but rather with making money and 
avoiding responsibility for any harm they cause.210  Nevertheless, 
under current laws and regulations, companies decide what research 
information and data to share, often designating the information they 
do share as “trade secrets.”211 
As a result, companies presently “engage in a voluntary and 
informal consultation process with the FDA,”212 such that GMOs in 
grocery stores (which include 80 percent of the processed foods sold) 
“have never been tested for human health hazards.”213  Because the 
FDA’s policy is to neither test nor label GMOs, “the feeding trials are 
taking place at our dinner tables.”214  
GMOs may pose long-term hazards to human health and the 
environment.215  Among other illnesses,216 food-related diseases have 
doubled since the introduction of GMOs,217 and food allergies are 
rising rapidly.218  Further, there has been “an increased risk of cancer 
from elevated levels of the IGF-1 factor in milk from cows treated with 
Monsanto’s genetically engineered bovine growth hormone.”219   
Additionally, herbicide use has increased dramatically since 
herbicide-resistant GMO crops were planted.220  Herbicides are known 
to pollute the environment and to “cause health problems for humans 
and animals.”221  In light of the increased herbicides and the fact that 
 
 210. See id. at 19 (“Corporations are about making money, not moral decisions.”); see 
supra Part IV. 
 211. Rowe, supra note 192, at 877. 
 212. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14. 
 213. Id. at 14, 20. 
 214. Id. at 40–41. 
 215. Hill, supra note 189, at 177–78. 
 216. See Secrecy Still Protects Genetically Modified Foods from Disclosure, CTR. FOR 
EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11944 
[https://perma.cc/3C9M-VCWY] (“In 2009, the American Academy of Environmental Medicine 
highlighted several animal studies that indicated serious health risks associated with GE 
[genetically engineered] food, including infertility, immune system problems, accelerated aging, 
faulty insulin regulation, and changes in major organs and the digestive system.”). 
 217. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 39 (“A study in Ireland showed that food-related 
diseases doubled during the same time that GMO food was introduced.”). 
 218. See id. (“GMOs are novel proteins that have never been in the human diet before, 
and allergies are rising everywhere.”); Secrecy Still Protects Genetically Modified Foods from 
Disclosure, supra note 216 (“[T]ests show that GE crops can induce allergies.”). 
 219. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 39–40; see also STEEL, supra note 53, at 205–11. 
 220. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 30 (“The most widely grown GMO crop is Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready soybean, a soybean engineered to withstand being sprayed with Monsanto’s 
best-selling herbicide, Roundup.”). 
 221. Id. 
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industry is feeding GMO corn to animals,222 it is not surprising that 
dozens of animal studies show serious health problems associated 
with GMOs.223   
When side effects occur in humans, the tort system does not 
provide an effective remedy.224  Because consumers generally do not 
know whether they have consumed a genetically modified product, “it 
becomes very difficult to establish a causal connection between the 
product and any resulting injury.  Moreover, without the requisite 
[information], it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to show that the 
risk of harm was foreseeable.”225   
Meanwhile, Japan, New Zealand, and the European Union 
have banned genetically modified ingredients,226 and “over 60 
countries around the world require labeling of GMOs, including 
Russia, India, [and] even China.”227  Yet, in the United States, 
agrochemical and agrobiotech companies have spent millions to 
convince the public that genetically modified foods are good while 
refusing to disclose the studies that have actually been conducted.228   
VI. CURRENT METHODS ARE INSUFFICIENT 
As evidenced by historical examples and current concerns, it is 
clear that regulations, laws, whistleblowers, the press, the police, and 
the courts are no match for companies hiding dangerous trade secrets.  
As things now stand, the public must wait until actual harm appears 
 
 222. See FOOD, INC. 21:12 (Magnolia Pictures, Participant Media & River Road 
Entertainment 2008). 
 223. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 40. 
 224. See Rowe, supra note 192, at 881–82. 
 225. Id.; see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 17 (“[T]he undeclared mixing of GM and 
non-GM products . . . obliterate[s] the possibility of detecting early warning signs of health or 
environmental danger. . . . [I]f after a number of years, any of the potential risks to human 
health do happen to materialize, it will be extremely difficult to discover the role of the 
transgenic product in the risk and then remove the product from distribution.”). 
 226. HILLSTROM, supra note 190, at 23; see also Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the 
Precautionary Principle into the UK, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra 
note 189, at 229, 241 (“The control of genetically modified organisms is one area going beyond 
traditional pollution control where, as a result of EC legislation, the precautionary principle is 
embodied in UK legislation.”). 
 227. GMO OMG (Compeller Pictures, Heartworn Pictures & Nature’s Path 2013). 
 228. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 62 (“There are reports of rigged crop trials and 
inadequate and unreliable industry statements to regulators, and many anecdotes about how the 
biotechnology industry has tried to smear its critics. . . . Chuck Benbrook[,] . . . one of the few 
independent economists who, using publicly available data, has shown that agricultural genetic 
engineering is not living up to its promises . . . said . . . ‘The level of intellectual dishonesty in the 
discourse on GM crops . . . [is] an indicator that we are losing the ability of critically evaluating 
the choices that we need to make, as a society.’”). 
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before anything can be done about it.229  And even after the public 
discovers the harm, it often takes many years to partially remediate 
the situation.230  Full remediation will likely never occur.231   
Through lobbying efforts, the industries are essentially 
regulating themselves,232 and such self-regulation is not working.  
Corporations focus on the bottom line, often at the expense of public 
health and safety.233  Many corporations are governed by a powerful 
elite that stresses silence and loyalty.  They and their obedient 
members are impervious to outside criticism.234  They take risks for 
one another and the organization, collectively agreeing to questionable 
actions that no one individual would take on his or her own.235  And 
given the various legal protections available, officers and directors 
face little personal risk.236   
Regulations and laws include exceptions for trade secrets,237 
such that “the name of the chemical, its manufacturer, intended uses, 
and production quantities are withheld as confidential business 
information” (CBI).238  One seemingly well-intentioned reform bill to 
 
 229. See Kelly, supra note 59 (“With no mandatory safety testing for the vast majority of 
the tens of thousands of chemicals used daily in America, doctors and public health officials have 
little information to guide them as they seek to identify potential health hazards[.]”). 
 230. See STEEL, supra note 53, at 73 (“[T]he harm to human health or the environment 
persists for decades or more even after the activity generating the harm ceases.”). 
 231. See BOK, supra note 1, at 272–73 (“There may be no victims ready to come forward 
or visibly injured because no one in effect feels victimized . . . . In toxic-waste disposal or 
embezzlement, . . . there are persons who would feel victimized if they knew about the crime, but 
who file no complaint since they are unaware of it.”). 
 232. See sources cited supra note 207. 
 233. See Rich, supra note 56 (reporting that rather than developing an alternative that 
would be “less toxic and stay[] in the body for a much shorter duration,” DuPont decided to 
continue using PFOA because “[t]he risk was too great: Products manufactured with PFOA were 
an important part of DuPont’s business, worth $1 billion in annual profit.”); Trade Secrets: A 
Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 53:47–54:00 (“Instead of changing its behavior, the 
petrochemical industry turned to the courts to stop the regulation. The companies argued that 
reducing exposure to benzene would be too costly.”). 
 234. See BOK, supra note 1, at 25, 123, 147, 173. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS § 2.01 (8th ed. 2017). For example, the business judgment rule presumes that 
officers and directors act in the best interests of the corporation; it protects them from liability 
for acts of negligence. Id. Likewise, directors and officers can obtain liability insurance that will 
indemnify them for defense costs. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra, § 23.03. 
 237. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012); see also MILGRIM, supra note 4 at § 12.03. 
 238. Sharon Lerner, A Chemical Shell Game: How DuPont Concealed the Dangers of the 
New Teflon Toxin, INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/03/03/how-
dupont-concealed-the-dangers-of-the-new-teflon-toxin/ [https://perma.cc/5LSR-RSUZ] (“When 
companies want to begin making and selling a new chemical, they are required to file a written 
notice with the EPA. But current regulations do not mandate that any particular health or safety 
studies be performed, and according to a 2007 report from the EPA, only 15 percent of new 
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the Toxic Substances Control Act would have actually caused more 
damage if it had passed, as it would have “allow[ed] companies to 
claim chemical identity in health studies as CBI.”239 
Some laws, such as the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
(DTSA),240 include provisions that aim to protect whistleblowers;241 
however, whistleblowers have historically not received adequate 
protection.242  “If those in charge knowingly manufacture unsafe 
products or engage in corporate bribery, then the open-door policy is 
but a trap for the outspoken; even when employees suffer no reprisal 
for having voiced a criticism to management, they will usually find 
that it has simply been ignored.”243  There are too many ways for 
 
chemical notices contain any information about the materials’ impact on health. Moreover, 
chemical manufacturers are permitted to claim that various parts of the information they give 
the EPA are ‘confidential business information,’ or CBI. About 95 percent of new chemical 
notifications, according to a 2005 Government Accountability Office report, include information 
that is protected as a trade secret, a figure the EPA confirmed as still ‘generally accurate.’ . . . 
Manufacturers have used the CBI shield to withhold the names and identities of 17,585 of the 
chemicals now registered with the EPA.”). 
 239. Id. (“Chemical manufacturers are required by Section 8 (e) of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act to report any information to the EPA that ‘reasonably supports the conclusion that’ a 
substance they make or use ‘presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment.’ 
But the critical information in these 8 (e) reports can also be claimed as confidential.”). 
 240. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No 114-153, § 7, 130 Stat. 376, 384–85 
(2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2016)) (providing “[i]mmunity from liability for 
confidential disclosure of a trade secret to the Government or in a court filing . . . for the purpose 
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law”). 
 241. See BOK, supra note 1, at 211 (“‘Whistleblower’ is a recent label for those who . . . 
make revelations meant to call attention to negligence, abuses, or dangers that threaten the 
public interest.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 83 F.3d 1575, 1581–82 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(denying plaintiff-whistleblower’s claim for retaliatory discharge because she did not report the 
violations to the proper authority); Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y. Univ., No. 96 CIV. 
5997(JFK), 1998 WL 474084, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs-
whistleblowers’ claims because they did not engage in protected activity of which defendants 
were aware); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981) (conceding that 
plaintiff-whistleblower had exposed serious misconduct, the court denied him protection for 
failure to recite with sufficient specificity how the defendant-employer had violated specific 
statutes); Luethans v. Wash. Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 172–73 (Mo. 1995) (granting summary 
judgment to defendant because plaintiff-whistleblower was a contract employee, rather than an 
at-will employee), abrogated by Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. 2010); Kern 
v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 252, 252–53 (App. Div. 1989) (dismissing 
plaintiff-whistleblower’s claim because defendant’s actions “did not create and present a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety”); Maus v. Nat’l Living Ctrs., Inc., 
633 S.W.2d 674, 675, 677 (Tex. App. 1982) (affirming judgment refusing to award damages to 
appellant-whistleblower because she was an at-will employee); see also Martin H. Malin, 
Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 277 
(1983). 
 243. BOK, supra note 1, at 226; see also Malin, supra note 242, at 286 (“The 
whistleblower must expect employer retaliation and weigh the consequences in deciding whether 
to act . . . .”). 
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employers to penalize whistleblowers without detection.244  
Furthermore, the whistleblower bears the burden of proof.245   
Likewise, the First Amendment’s freedom of the press246 cannot 
protect the public from dangerous trade secrets.  After all, the media 
cannot shed light on what it cannot see.247  Moreover, when the media 
becomes aware of certain information, it often serves commercial 
interests.248   
Additionally, the US criminal justice system does not treat 
criminals from different social backgrounds equally.249  As such, laws 
relating to white-collar crime (e.g., toxic waste violations) do not have 
enough teeth to counter the use of trade secrets that damage the 
public health.250  Further, such abuses are hard to detect if no one 
brings a complaint.251  Ordinary police methods therefore “do not serve 
well against such crimes.”252   
Civil litigation is also not an effective solution, as victims are 
often unaware of the cause of their injuries253 and, even if they 
 
 244. See BOK, supra note 1, at 212, 227. While demotion, dismissal, salary reduction, and 
job reassignment are noticeable adverse actions, retaliation can also be more subtle (e.g., denial 
of promotion, negative evaluation, increased surveillance, ostracizing the employee, hostile 
remarks). See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 245. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240; 1 
EDWARD T. ELLIS & GREGORY C. KEATING, WHISTLEBLOWING AND RETALIATION § 2.1 (2016). 
 246. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . 
the press.”). 
 247. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012). The Freedom of Information Act includes nine 
exemptions, including but not limited to “trade secrets,” “privileged or confidential” information, 
or “commercial or financial information.” Id. 
 248. See BOK, supra note 1, at 264 (“The press and other news media rightly stand for 
openness in public discourse. . . . Yet the media serve commercial and partisan interests in 
addition to public ones; and media practices of secrecy, selective disclosure, and probing should 
not be exempt from scrutiny.”); Esther Gal-Or, Tansev Geylani & Tuba Pinar Yildrim, The 
Impact of Advertising on Media Bias, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 92, 96–97, 99 (2012). 
 249. See BOK, supra note 1, at 269; Cedric Michel, Violent Street Crime Versus Harmful 
White-Collar Crime: A Comparison of Perceived Seriousness and Punitiveness, 24 CRITICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 127, 138 (2016). 
 250. See BOK, supra note 1, at 269 (“The burden of white-collar crime is immense; 
through the corruption of a few, it weighs on all citizens. White-collar or economic crime 
encompasses such activities as tax fraud, bribery, labor racketeering, arson-for-profit, insurance 
fraud, and toxic-waste violations. It has been estimated to cost the nation ten times as much as 
all the street crimes . . . put together . . . .”). 
 251. See id. at 273. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See BOK, supra note 1, at 272–73 (“In toxic-waste disposal or embezzlement, on the 
other hand, there are persons who would feel victimized if they knew about the crime, but who 
file no complaint since they are unaware of it.”); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, 
at 46:38–46:58 (“No public warning was issued. Now, 30 years later, those hairdressers and their 
customers are unaware of the risks to which they were exposed. And it is impossible to know how 
many women may have been sick or died—without knowing why.”). 
1170 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 20:4:1135 
surmise such liability, they do not have the proof needed.254  For 
diseases related to chemical exposure, moreover, the long-term onset 
of the illness may present additional hurdles to recovery, such as 
statutes of limitations and intervening bankruptcies.255  In the rare 
situation when someone actually gets close to proving his or her 
claims, the company offers a settlement under a strict nondisclosure 
agreement.256   
When cases actually go to trial, the court system has generally 
not been effective.  In fact, some courts have held that the general 
public interest in revealing trade secrets was minimal because the 
transfer of the secret between private commercial parties did not 
prejudice the public.257  However, when the exchange is no longer 
 
 254. See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CS218078-A, CHEMICALS, CANCER, AND YOU 3, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/emes/ 
public/docs/Chemicals,%20Cancer,%20and%20You%20FS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HTV-S4DZ] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (“Getting cancer from a chemical depends on . . . [t]he kind of chemical 
you were exposed to, [h]ow much of the chemical you were in contact with, [h]ow long the contact 
lasted, [h]ow often you were exposed, [w]hen you were exposed, [h]ow you were exposed, and 
[y]our general health.”); Rowe, supra note 192, at 881–82 (“With genetically modified foods, 
however, the tort system is not a feasible option. Since consumers are generally unaware that 
they have even consumed a genetically modified food, it becomes very difficult to establish a 
causal connection between the product and any resulting injury. Moreover, without the requisite 
research to evaluate genetically modified foods, it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to show that 
the risk of harm was foreseeable, or conversely, independent research could also reveal that the 
products pose very little risk.”); Laura Lorenzetti, The Roundup Problem: Why It’s So Hard to 
Pinpoint What Causes Cancer, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/15/roundup-
monsanto-cancer-link-hard-to-prove/ [https://perma.cc/RK7W-WQ3R]. 
 255. See Thomas J. Martin, Long-Term Liability for Hazardous Waste Induced Injury in 
Missouri: Latent Harm Sufferers Beware, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 299, 304–05, 305 
n.26, 313 (1985). 
 256. See Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients, 
Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, GP SOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 25, 25, 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfi
dentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/ARA4-PFKG] (“Confidentiality prevents the public from knowing about 
systemic wrongful conduct. It can also prevent regulators and government agencies from 
performing their duty to enforce the law and protect the public. The purpose of the court is to 
evenly administer justice to all so that all are protected by the law. When violations are hidden 
by confidentiality, the legal system itself is thwarted from fulfilling one of its fundamental 
purposes: to protect the citizenry from wrongful conduct.”). 
 257. See Levine, supra note 49, at 148–49; see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 
24, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[F]or a state to be able to completely destroy valuable trade secrets, it 
should be required to show more than a possible beneficial effect.”); In re Denture Cream Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 09-2051-MD, 2013 WL 214672, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2013) (deciding that the 
corporation’s interests in protecting the information outweighed the public’s interest, stressing 
that the lack of any FDA request for the information undermined the plaintiff’s argument that 
disclosure was necessary because of great public health and safety concerns, and reasoning that 
if the FDA did not need the information, then it must not be important); Van Etten v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1384 n.4 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (finding, in a case 
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between private commercial parties, but involves the public, the public 
interest becomes strong.258  Unfortunately, courts have failed to keep 
up with this shift.  The result is that, under the traditional view of 
trade secrecy law, no one can examine the relevant information 
because it must be strictly hidden from the public.259 
Suffice it to say, change is needed.  However, “it is important to 
recognize and balance the interests of all the stakeholders 
involved.”260  While investment in research and development should be 
protected, the public’s interest should also be safeguarded.261  The 
question then becomes, What should be changed?  Part VII discusses 
some previously offered, yet ineffective, solutions; thereafter, Part VIII 
offers a recommendation.   
VII. OTHERS’ SUGGESTIONS 
The dilemma of companies concealing dangerous ingredients as 
trade secrets—choosing profits over public health and environmental 
welfare—is not a new one.  Many legislators, scholars, and journalists 
have grappled with the issue.  And while no perfect solution has been 
offered, their actions and proposals should be considered and, where 
helpful to solving the dilemma, built upon.   
Certainly, more could be done to protect human health and the 
environment, such as requiring those with legislative or regulatory 
influence “to reveal their ties to the relevant industries,” widen the 
 
involving negligent design or manufacture of car tires,  that “concerns of public health and safety 
trump any right to shield [trade secret] material from public scrutiny”), vacated sub nom. Chi. 
Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no trade 
secret and explaining the “good cause” test, wherein the party seeking document protection must 
show that its interests in keeping the information secret outweigh the opposing party’s interest 
in obtaining the information); Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that California’s Air Toxics “Hot Spots” 
Information and Assessment Act of 1987 favored granting trade secret status over disclosure to 
the public, thus the exemptions granted “[were] absolute, and [did] not depend upon a further 
balancing of harm to the public”). 
 258. See Levine, supra note 49, at 148–49; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1007 (1984) (holding that loss of trade secrets is not a taking when one receives an economic 
advantage for it); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1919) (“The right of a 
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be held subject to the 
right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require 
that the nature of the product be fairly set forth.”). 
 259. See Levine, supra note 49, at 151 (“[U]nder trade secrecy law there is no opportunity 
for the general public to easily examine information deemed secret.”); id. at 190 (“[C]ourts have 
had a difficult time determining what a ‘public concern’ is for purposes of First Amendment 
protection of disclosure.”). 
 260. Rowe, supra note 192, at 891–92 (addressing patent protection, as opposed to trade 
secrets). 
 261. See id. 
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regulatory process “to include a range of specialists,” “seek[] greater 
citizen participation in the regulatory process,” and “mandate[] the 
labeling and traceability of the novel products.”262    
In terms of legislation, California often leads the way when it 
comes to protecting consumers and the environment.263  For example, 
in October 2013, California enacted the Safer Consumer Product 
(SCP) regulations.264  The regulations identify approximately 1,200 
chemicals as “chemicals of concern,” such that manufacturers are 
required to disclose products containing these chemicals.265  However, 
as with other laws, these regulations carve out some exceptions for 
trade secrets.266  Less than five months after the regulations’ effective 
date, “trade secret” was already listed as an ingredient in 1,445 
products.267  Thus, while legislators have admirable goals in  
mind—namely, protecting their citizens from toxic chemicals268—the 
trade secret carve-outs in those laws (as with the laws discussed in 
Parts IV and V above) curtail the state and federal governments’ 
abilities to meet such goals.  
 
 262. WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 22–24, 120 (“Precautionary measures may include 
things like additional research, labeling requirements, and creating new regulatory agencies.”). 
 263. See Daniel Corbett & Mark Mermelstein, Green Chemistry and Trade Secrets: 
California Leads Chemical Disclosure Movement, As Companies Wrestle with Options for 
Protection, ORRICK: TRADE SECRETS WATCH (Feb. 14, 2014), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-
watch/2014/02/14/green-chemistry-and-trade-secrets-california-leads-chemical-disclosure-
movement-as-companies-wrestle-with-options-for-protection/ [https://perma.cc/RU3V-6D5P]; 
Ronald White, New California Regulations Lead the Way in Protecting Consumers from Toxic 
Chemicals, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T: CITIZEN HEALTH & SAFETY (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/new-california-regulations-lead-way-protecting-consumers-toxic-
chemicals [https://perma.cc/Q98D-6PGP]; see also Chris Conley, California Leads on Electronic 
Privacy. Other States Must Follow., ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Oct. 13, 2015, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/california-leads-electronic-privacy-
other-states-must [https://perma.cc/45B2-NXMW] (regarding electronic privacy); Abby 
Goodnough, California Tries to Guide the Way on Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/health/policy/california-tries-to-lead-way-on-health-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/28E2-MC62] (regarding healthcare); Katrina vanden Heuvel, Opinion, Once 
Again, California Leads the Way, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/once-again-california-leads-the-way/2015/12/08/ 
3bdc8cf4-9d0a-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html?utm_term=.1335484a7ae0 
[https://perma.cc/2TNA-C3QY] (regarding climate change). 
 264. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 69501(a) (2018). 
 265. See Corbett & Mermelstein, supra note 263; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,  
§ 69502.2(a); Candidate Chemicals List, CAL. DEP’T TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, 
http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SCP/CandidateChemicals.cfm [https://perma.cc/XQM8-PT4R] (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2018). 
 266. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 69509, 69505.7(a)(4). 
 267. Corbett & Mermelstein, supra note 263. 
 268. See id. (“At least 33 states are considering new regulations of toxic chemicals in 
products.”). 
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Some scholars have proposed eliminating trade secret 
protection altogether and instead requiring technical information to be 
solely protected by patents.269  In this regard, it could be argued that 
technical protection should be preempted by the current patent law, 
the America Invents Act of 2011.270  In 1974, the last time the US 
Supreme Court examined this issue, it was reviewing the Patent Act 
of 1952 against Ohio’s common law–based trade secret law that, at the 
time, required use—as opposed to the UTSA (adopted in Ohio in 1994) 
or the DTSA, neither of which require use.271  Therefore, if a case 
becomes available for a plaintiff to make this argument, then it would 
be interesting to see whether and how the Supreme Court would rule 
on the preemption issue based on the new laws.  Unfortunately, 
neither the public nor the environment can wait for that possibility.   
Wendy Wagner argues that “[t]he most sweeping way to 
address this problem would be for Congress to make it illegal to 
invoke trade secret and other protections to classify information about 
the adverse effects of products and activities that threaten public 
health and the environment.”272  She states that “[a] requirement 
mandating the reporting of all health-related information (including 
the chemical compositions of products and wastes) could be enforced 
with both civil and criminal sanctions and levied against any party 
involved in producing or concealing information.”273 
Focusing on the use of trade secrets in the public 
infrastructure,274 David Levine proposes several partial solutions that 
 
 269. E.g., Levine, supra note 49, at 170 (“[T]he better option is to severely limit, or 
eliminate entirely, the application of the doctrine [when dealing with public infrastructure].”); id. 
at 177 (“[A]bandonment of secrecy as a business strategy may also benefit the businesses 
themselves . . . .”); id. at 187–88 (“The basic solution is to abandon trade secrecy altogether and 
simply require commercial public infrastructure providers to find their protection in patent.”). 
 270. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
as amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 271. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (discussing Ohio trade 
secret law, which originated from the Restatement of Torts, in light of the 1952 Patent Act and 
finding that “Ohio’s law of trade secrets is not preempted by the patent laws of the United 
States”); see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), (4) (2012); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), § 1 cmt. (amended 
1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (“The definition of ‘trade secret’ contains a reasonable departure 
from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade secret be 
‘continuously used in one’s business.’ The broader definition in the proposed Act extends 
protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade 
secret to use.”); ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 30, at 41 (“Among the main differences between 
the earlier Restatement of Torts definition of a trade secret and the more modern [Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act] and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition definitions are that the latter do not 
require that the secret be ‘in use’ by the owner in order to qualify for protection.”). 
 272. Wagner, supra note 48, at 1726–27. 
 273. Id. at 1727. 
 274. See generally Levine, supra note 49. 
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would increase transparency: (1) narrowing the definition to that 
which “is actually used in commerce or where its disclosure would 
pose an immediate threat to the security of the infrastructure itself”; 
(2) limiting the duration of trade secrecy; and (3) changing the 
remedies allowed by limiting relief to monetary damages and “denying 
injunctive relief for the misappropriation or innocent release of public 
infrastructure trade secrets.”275  The suggestion to amend the 
definition of trade secret law276 is well taken; however, the limitation 
to infrastructure alone will not solve the dilemma posed herein.   
Elizabeth Rowe takes a similar tack regarding food-related 
patents.277  She “concludes that, on balance, the public interest in 
promoting independent research on the health and safety effects of 
foods should outweigh the patent holder’s interest in controlling the 
state of adverse information available about its product.”278  Her 
article recommends “that courts use a ‘patent overreach’ doctrine to 
rein in” patent law’s limitation of access and restriction of research 
where public health and safety may be threatened.279  She also calls 
for a greater discussion “about reconciling patenting with public 
policy, and patenting with science and research” because Congress 
and the courts should evaluate patent law’s role “in limiting, rather 
than promoting, the progress of science, especially when public health 
and safety is implicated.”280  Although patent protection is rooted in 
the Progress Clause281 and federal trade secret protection is rooted in 
the Commerce Clause,282 Rowe’s logic could and should be applied to 
 
 275. Id. at 191–92. 
 276. Id. (“[T]he commercial definition of a trade secret could be narrowed . . . to only 
apply to information that is actually used in commerce or where its disclosure would pose an 
immediate threat to the security of the infrastructure itself.”). 
 277. See Rowe, supra note 192, at 892–93. 
 278. Id. at 892. 
 279. Id. at 862, 892. “[T]he primary concern of the patent system is the public 
interest.” Id. at 882–83 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 
(1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchem. Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31 
(1945)). Therefore, “[w]here patent overreaching violates our sensibilities about justice and 
fairness and potentially threatens public health and safety, courts . . . should take notice in order 
to protect the public interest.” Id. at 889. 
 280. Id. at 893. 
 281. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 282. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”). 
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trade secret law, as one of the policy goals underlying trade secret 
protection is the encouragement of innovation.283   
Those impacted by dangerous trade secrets should have access 
to such information.  In this regard, Sissela Bok argues that if the 
secret involves a practice that is harmful to the public, then it should 
be revealed regardless of the loss of benefits to the trade secret 
owner.284  Similarly, Levine, along with nine other law professors, sent 
a letter (citing Rowe’s article) to the Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation 
Commission in October 2013, stating that  
it is a basic principle in a democracy that the public shall conduct informed debate 
and discussion of public matters.  To do this, there must be broad access to data 
about potential environmental, health and safety (EHS) hazards, even when the 
disclosure of such information might pose some pecuniary risk to the firms that are 
introducing the possibility of [such] risks.285  
Finally, Philip Landrigan, Chairman of the Department of 
Preventative Medicine at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, would have 
chemicals presumed “guilty until they are proven innocent.”286  He 
asserts that this could be accomplished by creating “an unpolluted 
political structure that is empowered to set regulations that protect 
the public health.”287  While it would be ideal to dismantle the current 
lobbying scheme, which enables various industries to protect their 
bottom line and, therefore, keep dangerous secrets hidden, that is not 
likely to occur anytime soon.  Concrete steps need to be taken now, 
and the best way to do that is through trade secret law itself.   
VIII. AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL: INCORPORATE THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE INTO TRADE SECRET LAW 
There are many benefits to trade secret protection, and it 
should not be eliminated.  Inventors and businesses need to protect 
their investment in research and development.  Thus, trade secrets 
 
 283. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); BOK, supra note 1, at 
147, 148. 
 284. BOK, supra note 1, at 148 (“[T]he secrecy may concern practices so harmful or 
invasive that they ought to be revealed, no matter how much secrecy would increase business 
incentives.”); id. at 162 (“[A]s soon as a study places human subjects, laboratory workers, or 
bystanders at risk, the investigators can no longer claim it as their intellectual property to be 
revealed or kept secret as they choose.”). 
 285. E-mail from David S. Levine, Professor, Elon Univ. Sch. of Law et al., to Cathy P. 
Foerster, Comm’r, Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, at 2–3, 9 (Oct. 14, 2013) [hereinafter 
Letter to Alaska Oil], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363099 
[https://perma.cc/CMH6-CQEJ]. 
 286. Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 59:39–1:00:02. 
 287. Id. 
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should continue to receive protection for legitimate activities.288  After 
all, not everyone is abusing the system.   
However, when trade secrets endanger others, broader public 
interests are at issue.  Public health should take priority over 
commercial interests.289  If ongoing concealment is harmful, then it 
may become necessary to reveal the trade secret or at least a portion 
thereof.290  Persons who might be adversely affected by a trade secret 
should be provided with “specific data that describes any discharges 
into the environment—including chemical identity, volume and 
locations of each chemical discharged—and data on health and 
ecological effects.”291  The scientific community is in agreement, 
having called for greater transparency for quite some time.292 
Under current law, the trade secret owner’s practices and 
products are presumed safe.  However, as explained above, that is 
often not true.  In light of the historical examples of trade secret 
abuse, the existing concerns, and the ineffectiveness of current 
methods to combat such abuse, the law should be revised so that the 
burden of proof with regard to public health is on the trade secret 
owner.  Creating or revising one environmental law or regulation will 
not fix this—trade secrets impact too many industries.  Rather, trade 
secret law must itself be changed.   
 
 288. See BOK, supra note 1, at 134 (“[T]hese institutions should be able to invoke 
confidentiality for legitimate activities such as internal memoranda and personnel files; but it is 
a different matter altogether to claim confidentiality for plans that endanger others.”). 
 289. See id.; Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 7 (“[T]rade secrecy should not impede 
disclosure of information when the information describes public risks that the trade secret 
claimant is itself creating.”). 
 290. See BOK, supra note 1, at 162 (“[A]s soon as a study places human subjects, 
laboratory workers, or bystanders at risk, the investigators [or owners of the information should] 
no longer [be able to] claim it as their intellectual property to be revealed or kept secret as they 
choose.”); Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 7. 
 291. Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 3; see also BOK, supra note 1, at 148; Trade 
Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 42:05–42:10 (showing a portion of an interview with 
Everett Hoffpauir, a former worker at Conoco, who stated, “we can’t live in a risk-free society. 
But we can live in an honest society.”). 
 292. See BOK, supra note 1, at 153 (“[M]odern scientists . . . have held free and open 
communication to be the most essential requirement for their work.”); id. at 170 (“Many 
scientists and scientific organizations have called for inquiries into the questions of responsibility 
and choice raised by the growing conflicts over secrecy.”); O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:13, at 
115–16 (“The American Public Health Assn. has called for policies that anticipate potential 
public health threats, require greater transparency, and provide for monitoring as part of an 
overall precautionary approach towards natural gas operations.” (citing The Environmental and 
Occupational Health Impacts of High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing of Unconventional Gas 
Reserves, APHA (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-
statements/policy-database/2014/10/02/15/37/hydraulic-fracturing [https://perma.cc/CZ6Q-
H3HC])). 
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The enaction of the DTSA in 2016 created a federal private 
right of action for trade secret misappropriation.293  The DTSA offers 
an opportunity to change trade secret law across the nation in a 
manner that would better balance commercial interests and public 
health.  This goal can be accomplished by incorporating the 
precautionary principle, which has been regularly applied 
internationally,294 into the DTSA’s definition of a trade secret at 18 
U.S.C. § 1839(3).   
The precautionary principle, often called the “better safe than 
sorry” principle,295 “holds that governments have an affirmative duty 
to take preventative measures to avoid harm.”296  The result is that 
public health and welfare will be better protected from corporations 
that place profit above ethics.  If, however, the corporation claiming 
trade secret protection provides sufficient evidence that its product or 
process will not cause harm, then it will be eligible for trade secret 
protection.  Essentially, incorporation of the precautionary principle 
into the DTSA would mean that corporations must prove that their 
products and processes are safe in order to receive trade secret 
protection.  This determination can and should involve third-party 
analysis, so as to avoid corrupted science.297   
The precautionary principle “shifts the burden of proof to the 
proponents of an activity or developers of a product, to show that it 
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 294. See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 19 (“The precautionary principle is now embedded 
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Europe, where companies generally are required to prove the safety of their chemicals before use, 
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 295. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 18–19. 
 296. Id. at 18. 
 297. See supra Parts III, IV, and V. 
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will not cause harm or at least to monitor and evaluate its 
performance over time.”298  It is preferable to shift this burden to those 
who want to gain trade secret protection, rather than expecting 
victims to subsequently seek compensation.299   
We need to draw lessons from past injuries.300  As illustrated in 
Part IV above, “damages from new risks can take many years to 
become evident[,] and then their effects can last for generations.”301  
The precautionary principle, moreover, “is precisely for cases of 
serious potential danger where risks are poorly understood.”302  This is 
even more critical when dealing with corporations that have 
knowingly exposed the public to dangers in the past.303   
Adding the precautionary principle to the DTSA should at least 
curb corporations’ use of trade secrets as a shield to conceal dangers 
from the public.  Moreover, this change to the law is likely to result in 
earlier detection of dangers to public health and the environment 
because, under the shifted burden, “uncertainty becomes the ground 
for additional caution, not for business as usual.”304  Companies’ 
“experiments” on the public and the environment “must be exposed to 
wider debate.”305  We have a “moral responsibility to protect future 
generations.”306     
 
 298. CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 19. 
 299. See Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contemporary 
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 301. Id. at 32, 46 (“The purpose of the precautionary principle is to help us address 
threats that are not immediate—ones in which the onset of harms may be delayed for decades.”); 
id. at 89 (“The precautionary principle . . . . aims at long-term, often invisible dangers . . . .”); see 
supra Part IV. 
 302. WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 49. 
 303. See O’Riordan & Cameron, supra note 299, at 18 (“[T]here ought to be a penalty for 
not being cautious or caring in the past. This suggests that those who have created a large 
ecological burden already should be more ‘precautious’ than those whose ecological footprints 
have to date been lighter.”); see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 116 (“Precaution . . . . 
mandates renewed efforts to expose commercial interests that disguise themselves as impartial 
science.”). 
 304. WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 34, 102 (“The precautionary principle incites us to 
debate about what risks we really want to take and under what conditions.”). 
 305. Id. at 102. 
 306. Id. at 111. 
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Precaution is not prohibition.307  The incorporation of the 
precautionary principle into trade secret law would not prevent 
corporations from making certain products or using certain processes.  
It would, however, require them to disclose trade secrets to the 
public—if and only if the corporation could not demonstrate that the 
product or process does not endanger the public or the environment.   
Inclusion of the precautionary principle need not be a barrier to 
development.308  On the contrary, precaution should result in better 
science and, therefore, improved performance.309  The precautionary 
principle is not designed to ask what the worst outcome might be.310  
Rather, it is concerned with existing evidence that there is a “real 
potential for danger.”311  If such danger exists, then the precautionary 
principle demands that experimentation or gradual implementation 
take place in order to confirm or deny the danger “before it becomes 
widespread or irreversible.”312  
To incorporate the precautionary principle into the DTSA, the 
definition of trade secret could be narrowed.313  For example, § 1839(3) 
could be revised by including an additional element, as illustrated 
below:   
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, 
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, 
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, 
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper 
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or 
use of the information; and 
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(C) the information does not endanger public health.314 
The rationale behind such a change is that ongoing protection of such 
secrets is contradictory to the underlying policies of trade secret 
protection: to incentivize innovation, maintain business ethics, and 
share information with employees and business partners.315  
Preventing the disclosure of environmental, health, and safety 
information necessary for informed debate of fundamental public 
concerns is not what was envisioned when trade secret law 
originated.316  Such protection “was not designed to address questions 
about access to information for reasons other than commercial 
competition.”317   
Of course, the biggest drawback to this plan is that the DTSA 
is a federal law that does not preempt state trade secret laws.318  
Thus, companies could still claim trade secrecy under state law.  
However, in the future, Congress could amend the DTSA regarding 
preemption, or the Supreme Court might rule that patent law 
preempts trade secret law in certain cases.  As discussed in Part VII, 
the last time the Court examined this issue was in the 1974 Kewanee 
Oil decision,319 a pre-UTSA case in which Ohio had adopted the 
Restatement of Torts’ definition of a trade secret (which required use) 
and long before Congress revised the Patent Act.320  Alternatively, 
states can begin amending their laws in the same manner suggested 
for the DTSA.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
Trade secrecy is an important mechanism for protecting 
investment and maintaining commercial ethics; however, it has also 
been abused over the years at the cost of public health and safety.  
Despite numerous attempts, no adequate solution has been 
implemented.  However, if trade secret law were to incorporate the 
precautionary principle, then that would properly maintain the 
balance between the owner’s assets and the public health.  
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